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Cover Image

(Arystan Baba Mausoleum, Kazakhstan)

An architectural monument of the XII-XIV Centuries, built over the tomb of the famous religious spiritualist Arystan Baba, who lived in XII century. The legends call Arystan Baba the teacher of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi (Turkic Poet & Mystic) and associate of Prophet Muhammad and believed to have more than 400 years of age. The construction consists of two parts, the Compartment burial vaults (gurkhans) and memorial mosque, joined with a big arched corridor. Since 1982, the mausoleum has been under the protection of the Kazakh government.

Sources:http://www.tourstokazakhstan.com/en/sights/south-kazakhstan/arystan-baba-mausoleum.html &
http://aboutkazakhstan.com/kazakhstan-visa

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RUSSIA'S CHANGING POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA: OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Shabir Ahmad Khan*

Abstract

Foreign Policy is something not tangible and reflected by deeds and agreements between states. Recent deeds and agreements between Russia and Pakistan as well as research confirm that there is an obvious change in Russia's policy of South Asian Region in favor of Pakistan. Russia recognizes Pakistan's importance for peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan and linking Eurasian Union with South Asia, Indian Ocean and beyond. Russia has stopped viewing India as a counter weight to China in the region. Rift between Russia and American led West has intensified in post-Crimea period and the USA-India strategic partnership is yet another factor responsible for Russia's changed approach towards South Asia. So changes in Russia's policy goals along with changes in international and regional orientations caused shift in Russia's policy towards South Asia. In contemporary regional geo-political environment, Pakistan needs to take positive and correct course of action through diversification of foreign relations, importantly by having close relations with Russian Federation as response to Russia's shifted policy and tilt towards Pakistan. It will enhance Pakistan's bargaining power in international dealings.

Keywords: Russia, Pakistan, South Asia, Afghanistan, China, Regional Geopolitics, USA

Introduction

During the Tsarist and Soviet eras the foreign policy of Russia was framed and implemented by highly centralized and authoritarian state. During the Tsarist period foreign policy in Russia confined to imperial court while in Soviet era Communist Party played the central role (Donaldson 2014, 122). In post-Soviet era, Constitution of the Russian Federation gives

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President the leadership role in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly reports to the President. The Defense Ministry and Intelligence agencies also play important roles in foreign policy realm. The most important intelligence agency in foreign policy domain is the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) which has a direct impact on foreign policy. Parliamentary influence, on the whole, is quite limited and likewise public opinion and the role of political parties in foreign policy formulation is in infancy.[1] The sales of military hardware to other countries significantly influence the Russian foreign policy while the energy resources also play an important role in shaping the foreign relations. One can observe that during the nineteenth century Russia used its mass army as a weapon of foreign policy, during the twentieth century Russia applied rocket and nuclear science and arms sales to influence friends and enemies while during the twenty first century Russia has vast energy tool and technology to influence friends and foes.[2]

Policy is something not tangible whereas it is evaluated, measured and reflected by statements, deeds and agreements between states. Four important levels or degrees of change in foreign policy have been identified.[3]

i. Adjustments which are refinements in efforts but policy remains unchanged
ii. Program changes i.e. methods or means change (instruments of statecraft) while purpose or policy goal remains same
iii. Problem or goal changes i.e. initial problem or goal which the policy addresses is simply lost or eliminated
iv. International (and regional) orientation changes which require basic shift in redirecting actor's role and activities towards international and regional affairs.

These levels or degrees of change are inter-related and not mutually exclusive. Sometimes minor adjustments can be determining steps towards fundamental changes in policy.[4] Keeping in view Charles Hermann's theory, this paper argues that the last two level of changes, that is, changes in policy goals and changes in international and regional orientations have caused a shift in Russia's policy and engagement in South Asia. The recent deeds and

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[1] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia.* 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 146

[2] Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Pak-Russia Relations: Visiting Moscow in 2007." *Central Asia, 62*. (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2008), 96

[3] Charles Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy". *International Studies Quarterly, 34(1)*. (USA: Georgetown University, 1990). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2600403.pdf, accessed September 07, 2017.

[4] Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia.* (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2004), 3.

agreements between Russia and Pakistan as well as research confirm that there is a clear modification in Russia's policy of South Asian region in favor of Pakistan where traditionally India occupied a central position for Russia. Recent developments in Pakistan-Russia relations such as lifting arms embargo by Russia, talks on selling of SU-35 and SU-37 fighter Jets and Mi-35 Attack Helicopters to Pakistan, Pak-Russia joint military exercises, accommodating Pakistan's views on stability in Afghanistan, arms deal and energy agreements demonstrate that Russia is moving closer to Pakistan while drifting away from its India-centric approach in South Asia. Factors responsible for this Russian policy shift in favor of Pakistan in shape of rapidly warming-up relations are being analyzed in this paper. Russian engagement in South Asia should not be seen in isolation from over all Russian foreign policy initiatives. This particular work, therefore, attempts to describe and evaluate the Foreign Policy of Russian Federation in general and in the context of South Asia in particular. In this context an effort is made to discuss and deliberate upon Pakistan-Russia relations in the rapidly changing international and regional orientations. The paper argues that there is an obvious shift in Russia's policy of South Asia by pointing-out convergences between Pakistan and Russia in the altered global and regional geo-political scenario. This policy shift has been validated by Russia's positive gestures towards Pakistan. Policy options for Pakistan vis-à-vis Russia's recent policy towards the region have been specified as recommendations.

Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

Russia's Foreign Policy can be categorized and explained in two main phases:

Phase I: 1991-2000, this period is characterized by change in global system of international relations from bi-polarity to uni-polarity due to the demise of Soviet Union, the decline in Russian economic and military capability due to the politico-economic transition and therefore an obvious tilt in Russia towards the West i.e. United States of America (USA) and Western Europe. It can be termed as a policy of band-wagoning vis-a-vis American led West in search of economic and financial assistance. The immediate post-Soviet Russia had two main groups i.e. the Atlanticists and the Eurasianists, in the realm of foreign policy and its direction. There were divergent views on the direction of foreign policy amongst the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, academic community and parliamentary circles of Russia. The Atlanticists included First Foreign Minister of Russian Federation Andrei Kozeriev, Deputy Prime Minister Egor Goidar and President Yeltsin who were for close relations with the West. The Atlanticists were in clear ascendance over the Eurasianists and there were even talks of joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because of

transition circumstances and the dual cause of democracy development and economic reforms necessitated greater focus on the American led West.[5] Boris Yeltsin has been termed as liberal Atlanticist while Putin is popularly known as Eurasianist.[6] In mid-1990s Evgeni Primakov replaced Kozeriev as Foreign Minister and stated that Russia has no permanent enemy but has permanent interests.[7] The Eurasianists or 'pragmatic nationalists' included academicians and government officials who advocated a special role for Russia in former Soviet space and to play role of a bridge between Asia and Europe because of its distinct bi-continental geographical location concerning Europe and Asia.[8] Russia during the decade of 1990s neither could pay attention to its near abroad nor could play any important role in world affairs mainly because of her economic, political and military weaknesses attached to the transition.

Phase II: 2001-2017, this period witnessed economic revival in Russia mainly because of high price of oil in global market and leadership role, resultantly a relatively politico-economic stable Russia started pursuing a policy of balancing the West, the search for multi-polarity and re-asserting herself in the world affairs in general and in former Soviet space in particular. Russia as the world largest oil exporter has amassed fifth largest world foreign exchange reserves. In 1991 Russia had just $12 billion in forex reserves which amounted to $ 524 billion in 2013.[9] As foreign policy of any state cannot be predicted nor can it be static because it is an outcome of many constantly changing variables at national as well as international level and same is the case with Russia during the second phase. Even the end of Cold War could not end the historical rivalry and suspicions between Russia and the West and Russia's 'look West' policy aimed at close strategic partnership with West remained severely challenged. NATO incursions into the former Soviet space and USA's denial of Russia's privileged role with in Common-Wealth of Independent States (CIS) ignited new tensions between the two. USA explicitly rejects Russia's notion of a privileged role and Russia's right to dominate the former Soviet space.[10] In post Crimea period Russia looks towards Asia particularly China for close economic and strategic cooperation. Russia's policy of balancing the West and the quest for shaping multi-polarity makes China the natural option for Moscow. Russia, since 2001, has been clearly pursuing balance of power theory which means to enhance the power

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5 Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Pak-Russia Relations: Visiting Moscow in 2007." *Central Asia, 62*. (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2008), 97.

6 Nazir Hussain and Khurshid Ali Sangay. "The Russian Resurgence and South Asian Region". *IPRI Journal, XII(2)*. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2012), 21.

7 Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia.* 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 121.

8 Ibid., 119.

9 Ibid., 10.

10 Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience,* (London: Chatam House, 2008), 97.

in order to protect national interests particularly when national security is threatened. Russia started asserting herself in the former Soviet space where it seeks a privileged role and considers it as her near abroad and her historical sphere of influence. Various institutional and organizational arrangements are being setup for Russia's privileged role such as CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union, Custom Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Peacekeeping forces.

Russia and the Former Soviet States

Since the adaptation of foreign policy concepts in the years 2000, 2008 and 2013, relations with the states of former Soviet Union gained top priority.[11] Russia considers the security of outer border of former Soviet Union a necessity for her own security. Economic gains is also a main motive behind Russian foreign policy towards CIS as these states can serve both as a consumer goods market for Russian products as well as a raw material or semi-processed material source. In Caucasia, Georgia faced severe Russian response as a result of Georgia's support to the Western supported energy pipeline i.e. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in 2008 (Russia-Georgia War) which resulted in cessation of Ossetia and Abkhazia. Azerbaijan joined a Western backed block known as GUUAM i.e. Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in the 1990s and Moscow therefore carries a soft corner for Armenia and support Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly the case of Crimea in Ukraine which is a main conduit of Russian energy to Western Europe was dealt harshly by Russia. The Crimea seceded from Ukraine and gas deliveries stopped to the gas-starved Ukraine as well as to Western Europe.

The American led Western military presence made Central Asian region Putin's first foreign visit's destination in 1999 as Prime Minister and 2002 as President. Hydrocarbon resources and significant geographical location in proximity to China and South Asia also make Central Asia important for Russia. Russia considers Central Asia as its back yard and traditional zone of influence. In Central Asia, Russia seeks to achieve a number of objectives including a leading role with a complaint China particularly in the realm of security, absent or least interested West and no threat from Islamic fundamentalism. Russia traditionally has followed a policy of having buffers on the peripheries. Russia views Central Asia as a buffer to Islamic South. According to a Russian scholar, Russia's current foreign policy objective is "Eurasianism" and the emergence of Eurasian Union is strategically

[11] Ibid., 283.

important for Russia to successfully compete globally.[12] The Eurasian Union i.e. Eurasian Economic Union, include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan while Tajikistan has yet to join the Union, replaced the Eurasian Economic Community on January 1, 2015.[13] Russia desires to use Eurasian Union as an efficient link between Europe and Asia. Importantly strong influence in Central Asia will be instrumental for Russia in furthering Russia's strategic and economic interests in rest of Asia. Russia without having established control over Central Asian Republics cannot effectively operate as a major Asian power.[14]

Russia's Changing Policy towards South Asia

During 1990s the economically declining Russia faced with catastrophic transitional shocks found itself unable to frame any effective foreign policy towards South Asia because of divergent views and lack of direction. South Asia had no attraction for Russia as both the rivals USA and Russia had almost abandoned the region in face of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russian foreign ministry published the 'Concept of Russian Federation's Foreign Policy' in January 1993 in which South Asia was listed at seventh place in its top ten priorities.[15] A complication in Pak-Russia relations during the 1990s was the issue of Chechnya which was perceived as supported by Taliban having the blessings of Pakistan. Though the entry of Aslan Mashkhadov, Chechnyan President was denied by Pakistan in 1998, a year later in 1999 his aide Zelim Khan Yandarbiev was allowed to enter the country.[16] Pakistan's political elite paid cool response to Russia due to Russia's traditional tilt towards India. Russia's stance on Kashmir and unwillingness to facilitate any dialogue on Kashmir undoubtedly contributed to Pakistan's position on Chechnya during that period. However, in 2003 former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf visited Moscow, declared Chechnya as Russia's domestic problem and gave assurance that Pakistan's territory would not be used to support terrorist activity.[17]

Russia's recent policy towards South Asia has attracted much attention because of some radical alteration in its traditional approach due to the changed regional geo-politics. In the post-Soviet period Russia's policy

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[12] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 251.
[13] (Vinocorov, 2017)
[14] Igor Torbakov, "Managing Imperial Peripheries: Russia and China in Central Asia", in Thomas Fingar, *The New Great Game*, (USA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 253.
[15] (Singh 1995).
[16] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 341.
[17] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 341-42.

goals have changed in South Asia. Russia has stopped viewing India as a counterweight to China in the absence of ideological and geo-political struggles between Moscow and Beijing. Instead Moscow and Beijing became close strategic partners and resolved their border dispute by dividing equally the disputed islands in the Amur River of Khabarovski Krai in 2004.[18] So this is not a 'program change', that is, change in methods and means while goal remains unchanged in Russia's policy rather the problem or goal which Russia's policy was addressing in South Asia is simply lost. Likewise the historical Russia-India convergence on Afghanistan is no more there as Russia considers Taliban as part of solution. Russia considers Islamic State's (IS) presence in Afghanistan bigger threat to Central Asian stability. India on the other hand also looks at Sino-Russian strategic cooperation and warming up Pak-Russian ties with suspicions. India remained an important arms market for Russia, however, the USA-India nuclear deal and growing USA-India strategic ties threatened Russia's foothold in Indian arms market. These are changes in regional orientation causing a change in Russia's policy goals.

Sensing the warmth between India and USA and close collaboration between Russia and China, Primakov the then Prime Minister of Russia presented the idea to form a 'strategic triangle' i.e. Russia, China and India against USA in 1998 in New Delhi.[19] India's response was not affirmative in the face of long-standing rivalry with Beijing and warming relations between New Delhi and Washington. Putin had visited India four times as president since 2000 and once as Prime Minister in 2010 but could not succeeded in drawing India away from its strategic partnership with USA. It is acknowledged that Russia's ability to keep India out of USA's orbit is limited.[20] Consequently Russia's India-centric approach in South Asia came to an end.

Pakistan was listed as a leading South Asian state with which Russia sought to further develop strategic and economic cooperation under President Medvedev's Foreign Policy Concept of 2008.[21] However, the two Foreign Policy Concepts of Russian Federation i.e. 2013 and 2016 do not carry any official statement on its policy towards Pakistan.[22] Since 2008,

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[18] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 283.

[19] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 337.

[20] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 339.

[21] M. Sarmad Zia. "Pak-Russia Defense Relations." *The Nation* . (Islamabad, March 27, 2017).

[22] Petre Topychkanov, *Where does Pakistan fit in Russia's South Asia Policy.* (January 16, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.rbth.com/blogs/south_asian_outlook/2017/01/16/where-does-pakistan-fit-in-russias-south-asia-strategy_681726, accessed 15/09/2017.

Russian Former President Medvedev and Pakistan's Former President met four times on the sidelines of multilateral meetings. In 2011, Russia and Pakistan underscored joint efforts for peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan and signed many agreements on cooperation in areas of energy and agriculture when the then President of Pakistan visited Moscow.[23] In 2014, Russia lifted embargo on arms supply to Pakistan while in November 2014 the defense minister of Russia visited Pakistan and signed agreements on expansion of defense and military relations along with agreement for Mi-35 helicopters' sale to Pakistan.[24]

In post-2014 period, Russia desires to manage security in Afghanistan in close cooperation with Pakistan as shown by arranging meetings over Afghanistan with Pakistan and China in December 2016 and February 2017.[25] Since 2009, Russia sought to increase its diplomatic footprint in Afghanistan and attempting to reach out to elements in Taliban.[26] In 2010, Russia written-off $12b loan to Afghanistan and started work on several infrastructure projects in the country.[27] In 2011, Russia agreed to a northern supply route via Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan for NATO supply which proved to be very costly in comparison to supply route via Pakistan. Russia's main objectives in Afghanistan seem to have a manageable chaos in order to bleed its arch rival USA financially, to prevent any spillover of instability into Central Asia and to have control over Central Asian-South Asian integration via Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With the USA in relative decline while China is growing more assertive, rules of the game are undergoing transformation.[28] Economically growing Asia is focused upon by great powers as the Centre of global power is shifting from West to Asia and new alignments and re-alignments are in gestation. This is change in international orientation. In 2010, Russia declared that 'Pivot to Asia' is an extremely important aspect of its foreign

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[23] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 342.

[24] Khurram Abbas, "Russia's Revival: Opportunities and Limitation for Pakistan." *IPRI*. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, February 4, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.ipripak.org/russias-revival-opportunities-and-limitations-for-pakistan/, accessed on September 11, 2017.

[25] Himani Pant, *The changing contours of Russia's South Asia policy.* (Observer Research Foundation, July 27, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.orfonline.org/research/changing-contours-russia-south-asia-policy/, accessed on September13, 2017.

[26] Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*. 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 335.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Himani Pant, *The changing contours of Russia's South Asia policy.* (Observer Research Foundation, July 27, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.orfonline.org/research/changing-contours-russia-south-asia-policy/, accessed on September13, 2017.

policy.[29] In post-Crimea period, Russia's geo-political priorities have shifted from West to East smoothly. The Western sanctions imposed on Russia and low oil prices in global markets have held back Russian economy. Russia is looking towards Asia for new markets as well strategic partners due to changes in international orientation. There is a clear shift in Russia's policy of South Asia where Pakistan assumes greater importance for Russia due to Afghanistan factor as well as to have access to the Arabian Sea and beyond via China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Russia recognizes Pakistan's geo-strategic significance in this region as Pakistan, due to its geographical location, has the potential to connect Eurasia Union with Indian Ocean and beyond.[30]

Russia's inner eternal character places her on antithetical course to that of USA.[31] Russia seeks to counter USA's influence around the world in various regions and South Asia is not an exemption. The common stance of multipolarity in world affairs has provided ground for Russia, China and Pakistan for closer cooperation. Most scholars believe that multi-polarity is more benign and stable because states view each other not as adversaries but importantly as potential allies also. In a unipolar world system a hegemon must protect and respect the sovereignty of other states and when it is not the case with in the global system then it gives birth to dissatisfaction with in the system and states try to increase their capabilities and challenges or try to replace the hegemon.[32] Same is the case with Russia, China and Pakistan for desiring multipolarity. According to Joy Mitra, *"the Russia-Pakistan-China triumvirate is a reality in the offing and has a far greater convergence of security objectives in Asia than a similar Russia-China-India grouping".*[33] Russia, China and Pakistan have the strategic means to neutralize possible negative impact of Indo-USA regional ambitions centred in Afghanistan. Russia and Pakistan both control the supply routes i.e. the Northern Distribution Network via Russia and Central Asia and via Pakistan's Chaman, Ghulam Khan and Torkham borders to USA-NATO troops present

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[29] Fatima Raza, *Russia in South Asia: Balancing US and China.* (March 14, 2017.). Retrieved from https://southasianvoices.org/russia-south-asia-balancing-united-states-china/, accessed 13/09/2017.

[30] Andrew Korybko, *Pakistan Is The "Zipper" Of Pan-Eurasian Integration.* (Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, September 15, 2015). Retrieved from https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/, accessed April 11, 2017.

[31] Kerry R. Bolton, "Spiritual Roots of Russo-American Conflict". Foreign Policy Journal, (August 14, 2015). Retrieved from https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/150814-Russo-American-Conflict-Bolton.pdf, accessed 06/11/2017.

[32] Michael O Slobodchiko, *Strategic Cooperation: Overcoming the Barriers of Global Anarchy.* (UK: Lexington Books, 2013).

[33] Joy Mitra, "Russia, China and Pakistan: An Emerging New Axis?" *The Diplomat.* (August 18, 2015). Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-china-and-pakistan-an-emerging-new-axis/, accessed on September13, 2017.

in Afghanistan. They can shape the outcome of Afghanistan's conundrum if coordinated their policies effectively.[34]

USA-Russia relations have become substantially tensed in post-Crimea period as according to media reports USA's shipment of military equipment unloaded at the Baltic Sea Port in Poland in September 2017 while Russia has increased its military activities in Belarus. Both the powers seek to counter each other around the world wherever opportunity presents itself which places Pakistan at a position of core interests for both the countries in this region. On the other hand, USA and Pakistan are drifting away from each other due to the unrealistic and discriminatory USA approach to the region. The recent Russia's stance on Afghanistan manifests Russian desire to deter USA from establishing a long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Russia's close cooperation with Pakistan will gave it a chance to gain a real foothold in this region.[35] Russia recognizes Pakistan's strategic importance in the region particularly regarding the final political settlement in Afghanistan. The suspicious USA role in Afghanistan i.e. strengthening Indian influence on expense of Pakistan's security while Russia's stance on accommodating Pakistan's views on stabilizing Afghanistan and countering USA efforts to contain Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan has further provided ground for close Russia-Pakistan cooperation.[36] Russia has also engaged China in its efforts to resolve the Afghan crises and Pakistan therefore supports and welcomes Russia's involvement in resolving Afghan issue.

Russia for the last many years has been focusing on Pakistan for building long-term military, political and economic relations. Pakistan-Russia joint military exercises 'Druzba 2016' in Pakistan and 'Druzba 2017' in Russia signify growing trust between the two states. At the same time, Russia values Pakistan's geographical location and desires to assist Pakistan in its peaceful integration into the multipolar Eurasian framework being constructed by Russia-Chinese strategic cooperation while multimodal CPEC provides the best opportunity to link Eurasia with South Asia.[37] To materialize this concept, peaceful and stable Afghanistan is the pre-requisite to provide direct contact between Eurasia, South Asia and beyond. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides yet another useful platform for

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[34] Manoj Joshi, *Understanding Russian Engagement in South Asia.* (March 17, 2017). Retrieved from https://southasianvoices.org/understanding-russian-engagement-south-asia/, accessed on 13/09/2017.

[35] Muhammad Hanif, "Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints." *IPRI Journal XIII(2).* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 63-86.

[36] Samuel Ramani, "Russia's Balancing Strategy in South Asia." *The Diplomat*. (September 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/russias-balancing-strategy-in-south-asia/, accessed September 14, 2017.

[37] Andrew Korybko, *Pakistan Is The "Zipper" Of Pan-Eurasian Integration.* (Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, September 15, 2015). Retrieved from https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/, accessed April 11, 2017.

Pakistan, Russia and China to deliberate upon regional issues of security and peaceful integration. Pakistan's permanent membership of SCO is undoubtedly a result of China's support but it would have been impossible without Russia's facilitation. In 2011, Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister of Russia endorsed and supported Pakistan's bid for permanent membership of SCO. Russia also condemned the Salala Check post attack by US-NATO forces in which more than twenty Pakistani soldiers martyred. The Foreign Minister of Russia declared it as unacceptable violation of a state's sovereignty.[38]

Russia's 'shift in approach' towards South Asia is caused by a number of factors:

i. USA's interference in Ukraine (Slavs land) US-EU economic sanctions on Russia in post Crimea period and tensions over Eastern Europe between Russia and US.
ii. Asia is growing rapidly and world power centre is consequently shifting to Asia where Pakistan and China enjoy leverages with huge armies and nuclear capabilities.
iii. US-India strategic deal and India's tilt towards USA on the expense of Russia.
iv. Pakistan can be an important arms market for Russia as Pakistan is the world seventh largest arms importer[39] while Russian economy heavily depends on arms export as the world second largest arms exporter.[40]
v. Pakistan can be an out let to Eurasian Union via CPEC to Indian Ocean and beyond as Eurasian Union can only be strengthened towards East and not the West.
vi. Pak-Russia interests coincide in the wake of US withdrawal from Afghanistan as both the regional states are real stake holders in peace of Afghanistan. Russia considers security of former Soviet borders vital for its own security.
vii. Russia is sensitive to instability and drug-trafficking from Afghanistan via Central Asia. Pakistan can be instrumental in bringing peace to Afghanistan and indirectly Central Asian stability will be assured.

This shift in Russia's policy due to the above factors and altered ground realities in Afghanistan, South Asia and Central Asia demand closer

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[38] Khurram Abbas, "Russia's Revival: Opportunities and Limitation for Pakistan." *IPRI*. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, February 4, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.ipripak.org/russias-revival-opportunities-and-limitations-for-pakistan/, accessed on September 11, 2017.

[39] M. Sarmad Zia. "Pak-Russia Defense Relations." *The Nation* . (Islamabad, March 27, 2017).

[40] Christopher, Woody, *The US and Russia are dominating the global weapons trade.* (December 28, 2016.). Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/us-russia-global-arms-sales-2016-12, accessed September16, 2017.

strategic cooperation between Russia and Pakistan. Prof. B.M. Jain opined in his article that China and Pakistan jointly sought to whip up the ripples in Moscow-Delhi relations to isolate Russia.[41] It is worth mentioning here that Russia, the third largest economy of the world, understands better with whom to deal and how to deal? There are a number of areas which provide common ground for shared interests between Russia and Pakistan i.e. from Central Asia to Afghanistan and from Siberia to Arabian Sea and beyond which guarantee long-term Russia-Pakistan engagement. Question also arises that which nations are responsible for US-India flowering relations? It does not seem like that because relations between states develop on the basis of mutual-benefit and convergence of interests. The evolution of International Relations is a dynamic and constantly changing process where convergences and divergences of interests amongst states develop accordingly. Policy changes with changes in international and regional orientation which require basic shift in a state's role and activities. The international and regional orientations have changed which forces Russia to redirect its role in world and South Asian affairs. As far as the growing Russo-Pak relations are concerned, this is a paradigm shift necessitated by the changed regional and global geo-political circumstances where Pakistan assumed greater importance for Russia.

Further, Mr. Muhammad Hanif has correctly pointed out that Pak-Russia relations are guided by the theory of realism according to which states try to defend their interests either by maximizing their power or by seeking alliances to create and maintain balance of power.[42] So the realist theory gives birth to convergences between Pakistan and Russia for inclination towards each other. The evolving Russia's strategy towards South Asia has been however reinforced by the Sino-Russia partnership aimed at creating a multipolar world order which totally denies B.M. Jain's theory of isolating Russia. Samuel Ramani view of Russia's current policy in South Asia carries some weight as he sees Russia pursuing a policy of balancing India and Pakistan by having military and strategic relations with both the countries simultaneously.[43] It can be beneficial in a sense that if Russia agrees to mediate between Pakistan and India, Russia would need the consent of both the countries. Pakistan may welcome Russia's mediation efforts for resolving Kashmir dispute whether these efforts are unilaterally or multilaterally under the umbrella of SCO. Russia plans to develop trust with

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[41] B.M. Jain, *Shift in Russia's South Asia Policy: Risks and Implications*. Jaipur, India. (December 23, 2016). Retrieved fromhttp://defencereport.com/shift-in-russias-south-asia-policy-risk-and-implications/, accessed on September13, 2017.

[42] Muhammad Hanif, "Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints." *IPRI Journal XIII(2).* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), 65.

[43] Samuel Ramani, "Russia's Balancing Strategy in South Asia." *The Diplomat*. (September 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/russias-balancing-strategy-in-south-asia/, accessed September 14, 2017.

Pakistan and eventually between Pakistan and India by interceding between them (along with China) for a cohesive multipolar world and ultimately make ground for India's involvement in the Eurasian integration via Pakistan.[44] Poor economic interdependence between Pakistan and Russia can be overcome by integrating Eurasian Union via CPEC to South Asia and to Indian Ocean and beyond. Russia and China, under the auspices of SCO, have the potential to persuade India and Pakistan to sit, talk and resolve their disputes for the sake of their generations. If this plan works there will be no space left for those who follow policy of divide and conquer.

There are forces at play to pull Russia and Pakistan away from each other therefore both the countries have to make sure that there relations remain invulnerable to external pressures or can survive in any kind of regional circumstances. As New Delhi may try to dissuade Moscow while USA may try to pressurize and dissuade Islamabad from strengthening ties with each other. Vladimir Putin has cancelled his planned visits to Islamabad twice in 2012 and 2014. According to Petre Topychkanov, "despite welcoming signals from Islamabad, Russia's leaders were slow in their moving towards Pakistan and Vladimir Putin never visited Pakistan".[45] However, both the countries need each other and must accord priority to re-arrange visit of the Russia's president to Pakistan. Russia has also shown interest to participate in Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Trans-Afghan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines but here again seem the external pressures as hurdles. Russia also signed agreement to invest $2 billion in North-South Gas Pipeline for LNG i.e. from Karachi to Lahore which had to be completed by December 2017[46] but unfortunately work has yet to be started on the project.

Policy Options for Pakistan

In the rapidly changing global and regional geo-political circumstances, Pakistan needs to take positive and correct course of action through diversification of foreign relations, importantly by having close relations with Russian Federation as response to Russia's shifted policy and tilt towards Pakistan. The altered regional geo-political circumstances also

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[44] Andrew Korybko, *Pakistan Is The "Zipper" Of Pan-Eurasian Integration.* (Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, September 15, 2015). Retrieved from https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/, accessed April 11, 2017.

[45] Petre Topychkanov, *Where does Pakistan fit in Russia's South Asia Policy.* (January 16, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.rbth.com/blogs/south_asian_outlook/2017/01/16/where-does-pakistan-fit-in-russias-south-asia-strategy_681726, accessed 15/09/2017.

[46] Zafar Bhutta, "North-South pipeline: Russia seeks to charge $1.25 per unit for LNG transport", *The Express Tribune.* (August 14, 2016). Retrieved from https://tribune.com.pk/story/1161903/north-south-pipeline-russia-seeks-charge-1-25-per-unit-lng-transport/, accessed September 15, 2017.

demand a well informed and rational foreign policy to adapt to changed realities in relations.

Pakistan's foreign policy has mostly remained one dimensional for most part of the country's history i.e. extra-dependence on USA. In the face of Pakistan's enormous but unfortunately unrecognized human and material losses in the US led War on Terrorism and unnecessary and unjustifiable pressure from USA, Pakistan desperately needs to diversify its foreign relations. Already American flirted Pakistan felt insecure and betrayed and therefore turned towards China and Russia. If one compares the Soviet Russia's military and economic assistance to India i.e. developing public sector companies like Baharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., and Indian Steel Industry[47] with the USA' strivial assistance in sustainable economic development of Pakistan, one would agree that America flirted Pakistan.

In contemporary geo-strategic environment of the region, there is convergence and congruence of interests between Pakistan and Russia. Russia has clearly tilted towards Pakistan and Pakistan needs to capitalize on the opportunity for having close strategic, political and economic relations with Russia. Pakistan's relations with Russia should be free from external pressures because having a free and independent foreign policy according to the core national interests is a fundamental right of every nation.

Pakistan due to its geographical location can balance interests of major powers in this region, by having close relations with Russia, Pakistan can gain additional weight as well as can positively enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis other powers. The current geo-strategic realignment of regional (and extra-regional) players and the plethora of internal issues constitute a huge edifice of challenges to our national security.[48] Pakistan needs to revisit its foreign policy and should prioritize its relations with Russia which has shown a clear inclination towards Pakistan in its shifted policy of South Asia in the changed regional geo-political scenario.

If Afghanistan harbors a strong but unfriendly government that plays in the hands of India on the indications of USA and blocks all Pakistan's projects in and around Central Asia then Russia would be the ultimate circle breaker for Pakistan.[49] There is a perception that USA desires a long-term military presence in Afghanistan to supervise the surrounding states and therefore least interested in peace of Afghanistan. Pak-Russia cooperation on

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[47] Himani Pant, *The changing contours of Russia's South Asia policy.* (Observer Research Foundation, July 27, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.orfonline.org/research/changing-contours-russia-south-asia-policy/, accessed on September13, 2017.

[48] General Raheel Sharif, *Note for Pak-Army Green Book.* (Rawalpindi: GHQ, 2015).

[49] Nazir Hussain and Khurshid Ali Sangay, "The Russian Resurgence and South Asian Region". *IPRI Journal, XII(2)*. Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2012), 21.

peace in Afghanistan is thus imperative and will be beneficial for peaceful integration between Central Asia and South Asia.

Pakistan needs allies who are technologically advanced and reliable and who prefer relations on the basis of equality. Russia can be proved a reliable as well as easy partner. The Russians have connectedness to themselves and to other human beings that is just not a part of American reality, there always seems to be more consideration and respect for others in any given situation.[50] Likewise the Russian traditional ethoses are intrinsically antithetical to Western individualism as the Russians have the community sense.[51]

Pakistan also needs to diversify its arm production and military hardware basket by having close military relations with Russia, the second largest arms exporter in the world.

Pakistan needs foreign investment in energy sector while Russia has accumulated vast experience and technology in the energy sector. It has also capital, technology and importantly the will to invest in Pakistan's energy sector as demonstrated by agreement on Karachi-Lahore gas pipeline, interest shown in IPI, TAPI, and in expansion of its own installed Steel Mill. Pakistan can definitely benefit from Russia's experience and involvement in these projects and therefore must provide incentives.

Pakistan needs to enhance existing official contacts with Russia. Pakistan's relations with Russia are mutually beneficial and therefore should not be seen against any third country because Pakistan's close cooperation with Russia does not stop it from having cooperative relations with other powers.

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[50] Barbara Jo Brothers, "From Russia, With Soul", *Psychology Today*, (January 1, 1993). Retrieved from https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199301/russia-soul, accessed 07/11/2017.

[51] Nikolai Berdyaev, *The Russian Idea,* (Macmillan Co., New York, 1948).

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PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Hashmat Ullah Khan **&** ***Muhammad Manzoor Elahi*****

Abstract

Central Asia, a newly born region of Asia, possess has been anticipated to excessive geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic significance for its peripheral regions. The region also assumed to became an epicentre of regional and global powers' strategic interests. The research focuses on the policy options for Pakistan in connection with its economic security as an extended peripheral actor of Central Asia. The natural oil and gas reserves of Central Asia can also serve as sources of economic connectivity between the said actors. The research accentuates that the region is one of the cost-effective source of energy for Pakistan. The Central Asian Republics' share in the world oil production is2.4 % (31.2 thousand million barrels) and the share of gas production is 4.2% (20.2 billion cubic meters).Despite historical affinities, religious commonalities and geographical proximity, Pakistan's relations with Central Asian countries remain to be strengthened. In addition, the research highlights the prospects and challenges faced in strengthening of economic interests between Pakistan and Central Asia when the landlocked region and the former provide shortest land route access. But this phenomenon could not be materialized due to poor law and order situation in Afghanistan. The New Great Game and the power politics of global powers also pose hurdles for Pakistan to develop strong economic ties with Central Asia and get benefits from its natural resources.

Keywords: energy security, geo economics, trade connectivity, natural gas and oil, Central Asia

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Introduction

"Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland (Central Asia) with the Arabian Sea and South Asia … We offer the critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally"

--- President Gen. Pervez Musharraf (June 15, 2006)

Central Asian Republics, i.e. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, combinedly having 64.7 million population and covering an area of four million square kilometers came into being in 1991 after the disintegration of USSR.[1] The region is rightly called the 'Heart of Asia'[2] as it endows with cross-border mobility and accessibility in Eurasia. The landlocked nature of the region makes it dependent upon its peripheral regions is West Asia, East Asia and South Asia. Central Asian Republics (CARs) have mainly relied on Russia, for trade connectivity with rest of the world.

No doubt, the southern tier of the region is a plausible strategic option to overcome the landlocked status. In the southern dimension, Pakistan's geographical position is a potential asset for the CARs. In this regard, Pakistan's policy options towards Central Asia are mainly revolving around three contending discourses: First upholds the principle of unipolarity and adheres the hegemonic discourse. This argues that one should line up one's foreign policy on the US strategic interests in Central Asia. Second discourse revolves around unipolar-cum-multipolar world and focuses on the policy of diversification. This discourse of 'strategic-alternatives' accentuates on strengthening up ties with China and Russia and other great powers of the world in order to maximize its policy options towards Central Asia. The third discourse talks about Muslim ideological bounds for the strengthening up ties with Central Asia.

Where's, Pakistan has been trying to make cordial ties with Central Asian Republics since their independence but the incident of 9/11 among several other factors changed the global and regional dynamics of power politics. Like many other states, Pakistan also became the victim of hegemonic discourse of the US. The volatile security environment of Afghanistan hampered the process of regional connectivity between northern and southern states. Later, the opening up of intermediary corridor, a transit trade route from Xinjiang-China to Balochistan-Pakistan, is reshaping the geo economic concerns of the region and providing opportunities to

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[1] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies,* 30(1), (Lahore: Area Study Centre, 2015), 128.

[2] Mubeen Adnan & Bushra Fatima, "Strategic and Economic Interests of Pakistan and India in Central Asia." *South Asian Studies*, 30(2), (Lahore: Area Study Centre, 2015), 187.

strengthen political and economic linkages between the regional states. Pakistan's geographical positioning in South Asia is a strategic asset for its northern peripheral (Afghanistan and China) and extended peripheral states (CARs).

Moreover, Pakistan has important strategic location which provides the energy rich but landlocked Central Asian republics the shortest route through Gwadar and Bin Qasim ports to other parts of world. Pakistan is not only a bridge between South and Central Asia but can also be used as an energy and trade corridor for CARs.[3] Pakistan offers rail and road links through which oil and gas from Central Asia could be transported to other parts of world,[4] but unrest in Afghanistan remain among many the main challenge in the way of all such plans.[5]

Pakistan provided $10 million in credit and $100,000 worth of medicines to each state of Central Asia after their independence. Later, it was increased to $30 million for Uzbekistan. In addition, 5000 tons of rice were also provided by Pakistan.[6] Pakistan also offered training facilities to Central Asian Republics in English language, accounting and banking, postal services, insurance and diplomacy.[7]

The historical and cultural affinities between Pakistan and Central Asia can pave way for the present-day collaboration and would also affect future policies of Pakistan and CARs. Their historical relations can be traced back to 2nd century B.C. when the nomadic people of both regions had cultural, economic and religious links with each other. The Indus Valley was once inhabited by Central Asian dynasties. Scythians, a Central Asian tribe, came from present day Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Pakistan via the Pamir region (Gilgit-Baltistan) and reached up to Taxila and Sindh. Later, relation between Central Asia and subcontinent became so strong that Peshawar remained the capital of Kushan dynasty. At that time, Peshawar was known as *Puroshapura*. The concept of *Shalwar-Kameez* was also introduced in the area at that time which later on became the national dress of Pakistan.[8]

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[3] Muhammad Manzoor Elahi, "Pipelinistan and Geopolitics of Energy Security: South Asia's Peripheral Options." in, Prof. Dr. Khalid Manzoor Butt & Muhammad Manzoor Elahi (eds.), *Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia*, Lahore: GC University, (2017), 259.

[4] Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for Iran and Central Asia: The EU's Interests." *Journal of European Studies,* 27(2),(2011), 6.

[5] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies,* 30(1), (Lahore: Area Study Centre, 2015), 128.

[6] Saifullah Joyo, "Pakistan and Central Asia: Past, Present and Future." *South Asian Studies,* 20(2), (2005).

[7] *The Daily Dawn*, 23/8/1993.

[8] Irum Shaheen, "Importance of Pakistan-Central Asia Relations: Opportunities and Constraints."*International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 1(14), (2011), 218-219.

Geoeconomic Potentials of Central Asia

Central Asia has been blessed with huge amount of natural resources. It has 31.2 thousand million barrels of proven oil reservoirs whereas its oil production was only 1357 thousand barrels daily in 2012.On the other hand, the proven gas reservoirs of Central Asia were 19.9 Trillion cubic meters in 2012, and a leading country in gas proven reservoirs is Turkmenistan. The Central Asian States production of gas was 141 billion cubic meters in 2012 and only Turkmenistan's gas production was 64.4 billion cubic meters during that period. Central Asian states has 4% of world proven oil reservoirs while producing 2.4% oil of the world, on the other hand Central Asia has about 10% of total world gas reservoirs while its production is 4.2%.[9]

Table 2: Oil and Gas Potential of Central Asia

Resource	Proven	% in world share	Production	% in world share	Leading CAR
Oil	31.2 thousand million barrels	4 %	1357 thousand barrels daily	2.4%	Kazakhstan
Gas	19.9 Trillion cubic meters	10 %	141 billion cubic meters	4.2%	Turkmenistan

Along with hosting the world's 2nd largest energy reservoirs Central Asia is also rich in metals. Out of 110 periodic table elements, 99 have been discovered in this region especially in Kazakhstan such as gold, magnesium, silver and uranium, tungsten, zinc, bohrium, lead, copper, chromite, molybdenum and fluorides etc.[10]

Apart from natural resources, Central Asia has potentials of trade and foreign direct investment. The flow of foreign direct investment in CARs increased 9 folds from 2000 to 2009 and its GDP grows 8.2% per annum.[11]CARs have market oriented new correlation of interests. The dissolution of USSR created a power vacuum and brought about commercial as well as political rivalry for abundant natural gas and oil reservoirs of the

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[9] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies,* 30(1), (2015), 143-144.

[10] Asma Shakir Khwaja, "Pakistan and the New Great Game." *Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI),*(5),(2003).

[11] Zehra Akbar, *Central Asia: The New Great Game.*The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs, October, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/central-Asia-the-new-great-game.html, accessed on 11/5/2017.

newly independence Central Asian States. Their energy resources are contributing to power politics at regional and global levels. Such environment is not much conducive for Pakistan.

Pakistan's Quest for Economic Security vis-à-vis Central Asia

A predominant objective of every country's foreign policy is to fulfil its economic interests while pursuing relations with other countries and such is the case of Pakistan's relations with Central Asian Republics (CARs). They are rich in natural energy resources whereas Pakistan is energy deficient state. The former is landlocked and having no seaport while the later can provide shortest route to the Indian Ocean.

The objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy in Central Asia has been determined by its economic interests, political and security requirements, countering Indian influence and the desire to be an energy transit corridor in the region. Pakistan as a gateway to Central Asia believes that close relationships with CARs will not only lead to economic development but will also improve its security at its northern frontiers. All competitors of Pakistan in Central Asia including India recognize that Pakistan's geostrategic location makes it hard for Central Asian Republics to rule out it.[12]

Pakistan is looking towards Central Asia for many economic connections among which energy is overwhelming. Pakistan, the 2nd largest populated state of South Asia and 6th most populated in world ranking, is also facing energy crisis. The commercial energy pool of Pakistan is covered by natural gas 51%, oil 29%, coal energy 8%, electricity 11% and nuclear energy 1%.[13]

Table 1: Commercial Energy in Pakistan: Consumption and Demand Forecast

Energy Resources	Year	Quantity in Million Tons of Oil Equivalent
Oil Consumption	2010	29.72 (29.7%)
Oil Demand Forecast	2020	30.94 (103%)
Gas Consumption	2010	39.21 (43.2%)
Gas Demand Forecast	2020	72.75 (165%)
Coal Consumption	2010	4.71 (42.7)
Coal Demand Forecast	2020	13.9 (278%)

Source: Regional Energy Security for South Asia, Regional Report, *SARI.* Retrieved from www.sarienergy.org/ProjectReport/RegionalEnergySecurity_RegionalReport_Complete.pdf>, 11/5/2017

[12] Shabbir Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan's Policy towards Central Asia: An Evaluation Since 1991." *Central Asia,* 65(6), (2009), 2.

[13] Marie Lall *et. al.*,*The Geopolitics of Energy in South Asia,*(Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (2009), 4-7.

Now a days, Pakistan is passing through serious energy crisis which is causing a decline of its economy and disturbing every field of life. Though, at present Pakistan is mostly dependent on Gulf Region for oil and gas but the oil and gas reservoirs of Central Asian Republics are a strategic remedy for Pakistan's energy crisis. Central Asia is the nearest and cost-effective source of energy supply for Pakistan. Comparatively, Pakistan could acquire advantageous position due to its geographic location making her a communicational hub for the entire region.

Economic stability in Pakistan can be achieved through strong economic relations with CARs. Pakistan cannot ignore the importance of Central Asia in any way. Due to realization of this fact Pakistan immediately recognized all Central Asian Republics after their independence in 1991. Peace and stability in Afghanistan also remains a top priority for Pakistan's foreign policy because of Pakistan's politico-economic interest to Central Asia.[14]

Prospects of Economic Connectivity: Pakistan and CARs

Due to its important geostrategic location Pakistan provides a shortest access route to land locked Central Asia to the Indian Ocean and other parts of the world. Pakistan is a bridge between West Asia, East Asia and Central Asia. The Karakorum highway, ancient Silk Road, connects Pakistan with China, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The port of Pasni, Karachi and Gwadar are about 1600km away from Central Asia which is the shortest trading route. If properly utilized it can probably boost up bilateral trade relations and exports and imports of raw material and manufactured goods.[15]It also provides shortest route to Central Asia to world energy markets. Though there is no geographical contiguity between Pakistan and Central Asia but transit-trade routes can be built via Afghanistan and China as both countries' borders are attached with CARs.[16] For land routes, Pakistan and Central Asia have the following options to reach Pakistani seaports:[17]

1. Road from Salang Pass, Kabul, Jalalabad, Peshawar, to Karachi and Gwadar.
2. Road from Tajikistan through Badakhshan, Peshawar to Karachi and Gwadar.
3. Via Karakorum Highway; Kashgar (China), Gilgat to Karachi and Gwadar.

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[14] Nausheen Wasi, "Pakistan's Interests in Central Asia." *Pakistan Horizon*, 55(4), (2002).

[15] Mubeen Adnan & Bushra Fatima, "Strategic and Economic Interests of Pakistan and India in Central Asia." *South Asian Studies*, 30(2), (2015), 192.

[16] Irum Shaheen, "Importance of Pakistan-Central Asia Relations: Opportunities and Constraints."*International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 1(14), (2011), 221.

[17] Mubeen Adnan & Bushra Fatima, "Strategic and Economic Interests of Pakistan and India in Central Asia." *South Asian Studies*, 30(2), (2015), 194.

Most important development in this regard is China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) signed in 2013. The economic corridor connects Kashgar with Gwadar through Khanjrab pass via 2700 km of road and rail network. This corridor will not only connect China and Pakistan but also work as an energy and trade route for Central Asia. Gwadar port of Pakistan is located on Gulf of Oman very close to Persian Gulf on Eastern side it is only on 75 km distance from Iran. From Karachi, it is around 460 km away.[18]The Strait of Hormuz, through which daily 13 million barrels of oil passes, is also very close to Gwadar port. Gwadar port is located between land locked Central Asia and oil rich Middle East. Approximately world's 40% oil trade is daily carried out from this Gulf.[19]

The inception of CEPC has turned Pakistan in a natural trade and energy corridor for Central Asian states. With the development of Gwadar port and its related road and rail links Pakistan will be the hub of trade of the entire region. It could bring a lot of trade opportunities and economic activities to Pakistan. At present trade between Pakistan and Central Asia is in a declining state. The trade volume between Pakistan and CARs has declined from a total of $81.19 million in 1997 to just $45.3 million in 2009.[20] If this planned route with Central Asia is developed then dependence of Pakistan will definitely decrease.[21]A new choice for Pakistan linkage with Central Asia is through Wakhan corridor of Tajikistan. The development of Gwadar Port is a big opportunity for Pakistan to obtain economic integration in surrounding region and serve as a regional and international transit trade facilitator for Central Asia. When Gwadar port is fully developed, all these countries may need access via Pakistan.

Energy crisis is the major issue facing the present-day world and every state is struggling to ensure her energy needs. Pakistan is also one of energy lacking state and facing a serious energy crisis which affects every field of life, looking for the durable and economical energy supply. Pakistan 80 % of her commercial energy needs fulfil by oil and gas and both these taking a handsome share of foreign exchange reservoirs.[22] Pakistan's domestic oil and gas production does not fulfil its needs. So, the energy resources of

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[18] Imran Malik, "The Geopolitics of South-Central Asia and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)"*Global Research,* (January 9, 2017).Retrieved from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-geopolitics-of-south-central-asia-and-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-cpec/5567353, accessed on 11/5/2017.

[19] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies*, 30(1), 2015, 145.

[20] Shabbir Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan's Policy Towards Central Asia: An Evaluation Since 1991." *Central Asia,* 65(6), 3.

[21] Shaukat Iqbal, *The New Great Game and Security Challenges for Pakistan*. (Karachi: Paramount Book (Pvt) Limited), 153.

[22] Kaleem Omar, *Energy Corridor Could Become an Economic Bonanza for Pakistan*. Business and Finance Review, June 19, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2006- weekly/busrev-19-06-2006/index.html#1, accessed on 11/5/2017.

Central Asia can be strategic asset in this regard. The geostrategic position of Pakistan allows her to not only fulfil indigenous needs but also can offer a plausible trade corridor to Central Asian States for their oil and gas exports.

However, the first ever mega project between Pakistan and Central Asia a concerns quad-lateral energy connectivity i.e. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. The feasibility for this pipeline was prepared in 2002 under the sponsorship of the Asian Development Bank. At first, the pipeline included three countries i.e. Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, but later on in May 2006, the plan was extended to include India.[23] Thus its total proposed length became 1,680 km, initiating from Turkmenistan's Daulatabad gas field up to India via Herat, Kandahar (Afghanistan) then Quetta, Multan (Pakistan) to Fez like city of India. It was propos to start its construction in 2010 so that gas supply would be started in 2015.[24] The Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) of gas was also concluded in January 2012.[25] According to the project details the TAPI pipeline will supply 3.2 billion cubic feet gas daily to the buyer countries.[26] It is also hoped that TAPI will contribute to the progress and stability of South Asia. It will not only strengthen inter regional cooperation but will also ebb away the Indo-Pak trust deficit.

Figure 1: TAPI Natural Gas Pipeline

[23] S. Frederick Staar (ed.), *The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia*. (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007).

[24] Muhammad Manzoor Elahi, "Pipelinistan and Geopolitics of Energy Security: South Asia Peripheral Options", in, Prof. Dr. Khalid Manzoor Butt & Muhammad Manzoor Elahi (eds.), *Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia*, Lahore: GC University, (2017), 263.

[25] Sujay Mehdudia, "TAPI Project Takes a Step Forward." *The Hindu*, 25/1/2012.

[26] *The News*, 04/02/2012.

Apart from the gas and oil reservoirs, CARs have also the potential to fulfil the demand of electricity in Pakistan. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have the potential of 40,000 MW and 26,000 MW of electricity respectively.[27] Pakistan has been facing severe electricity crisis since many years. During the working hours, the shortfall of electricity reaches upto 7000 MW. Demand of electricity in Pakistanis increasing about 7% to 8% annually.[28] TheCASA-1000 electricity export scheme has been signed in 2007. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the parties to this project. CASA-1000 will supply electricity from Kyrgyzstan through Tajikistan to Afghanistan which then will reach the Pakistani city Peshawar. It will supply Afghanistan 300 MW and Pakistan 1000 MW.A 450Km long transmission line will be built between Datka of Kyrgyzstan to Khodzhent of Tajikistan and another 750 km long transmission line, 117 km in Tajikistan, 526 km in Afghanistan and 71 km in Pakistan will be built from Sangtuda of Tajikistan through Kabul to Peshawar. The total coast of CASA-1000 has been estimated to 970 million dollars. Afghanistan will contribute $ 300million, Tajikistan $270 million, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan will provide$200 million each one.[29]

Furthermore, Uzbekistan has the world's 5th biggest gold reservoirs,[30] from which Pakistan can also take benefits. Apart from energy resources there are a lot of trade opportunities for Pakistani goods in Central Asia. Pakistan's medium and small productions and consumer goods can find a vital market in Central Asia.[31] Pakistan has also the capability to supply textiles, cement, medicines, shoes, telecom equipments, garments, machinery and defence equipments.

Regional Challenges

Although, the hopes for cooperative financial, political and strategic collaboration with Central Asia is an important aim for Pakistan's foreign policy but she is still facing many difficulties, irritants and hurdles in increasing cooperation with CARs, fulfilling economic interests and utilizing

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[27] Muhammad Manzoor Elahi, "Pipelinistan and Geopolitics of Energy Security: South Asia Peripheral Options." in, Prof. Dr. Khalid Manzoor Butt & Muhammad Manzoor Elahi (eds.), *Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia*, Lahore: GC University, (2017), 264.

[28] Vladislav Vucetic & Venkataraman Krishnaswamy, *Development of Electricity Trade in Central Asia-South Asia Region.* Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/556101110009170776 5/21358230/AfghanistanElectricityTradePaperforDelhiRECC(111006).pdf, accessed on 11/5/2017.

[29] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies,* 30(1), (2015), 142-143.

[30] Faisal Javaid & Asghar Ali Dashti, "Relations between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics: An analysis." *Ma'arif Research Journal,* 11, 73.

[31] Irum Shaheen, "Importance of Pakistan-Central Asia Relations: Opportunities and Constraints."*International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 1(14), (2011), 221.

their economic potentials. The most important challenge which Pakistan faces to fulfil its economic interests in Central Asia is the lack of a common border with any state of Central Asia. Tajikistan is separated from Pakistan by Wakhan strip which is only 16 km narrow strip, accessible through Afghanistan and China[32] but the law and order situation in Afghanistan is the main barrier in this respect. Otherwise, land access between Pakistan and Central Asia is possible.

All shortest and main routes to Central Asia from Pakistan pass through Afghanistan, and, without restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan neither Pakistan nor CARs can move forward with the desired economic corridors and other projects like TAPI and CASA-1000 to create a viable economic zone. Terrorism in Afghanistan has cast a very negative impact on trade links between both the regions.[33] "The worst law and order situation is the main obstacle in the way of proposed oil and gas pipelines to import gas and oil from CARs to Pakistan. Moreover, opposing interests of regional and global powers present in Afghanistan are also a critical obstacle in inter-regional connectivity".[34] Many agreements have been signed to advance the communication links between Pakistan and CARs, including road and rail links.

In addition, an absence of basic network of road connectivity and lack of infrastructural developments are hindering the process of energy cooperation between Pakistan and Central Asia. At present, there is no pipeline connecting Central Asian gas and oil fields with Pakistan. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in May 1997 between two oil companies UNOCAL and Sandi Delta Oil for the building of an oil pipeline to import oil from Turkmenistan to Pakistan passes through Afghanistan but, unfortunately, this plan could not be materialized due to war in Afghanistan and ultimately UNCOCAL left this plan.[35] Weak economic condition and political crises are also affecting such projects. The projects Pakistan has planned in commerce, trade and particularly in the energy sector with Central Asian States are also pending due to weak economy of Pakistan.

Pakistan provides a transit trade link to Central Asia and China for access towards Middle East. Likewise, Pakistan could also extend plausible access to Central Asia and Afghanistan for India and vice versa. The

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[32] Farhat Asif, "Pakistan's ties with central Asian States: irritants and challenges." *Research Journal of Conflict and peace studies, 4*(1), (2011), 6.

[33] Ahmed Rashid, *Karzai Embraces Risky Plan to end Afghanistan-Pakistani Antagonism*. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101206_pr.shtml, accessed on 11/5/2017.

[34] Hashmat Ullah Khan & Faarina Ayaz, "China-Afghanistan Relations after 9/11 and its Prospects for Peace Building in Afghanistan." in, Prof. Dr. Khalid Manzoor Butt & Muhammad Manzoor Elahi, (eds.), *Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia*, Lahore: GC University, (2017), 168.

[35] Umbreen Javaid & Azhar Rashid, "Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan." *South Asian Studies*, 30(1), (2015), 142.

network of economic connectivity is only possible when peace and security is restored in Afghanistan. To reach CARs, the Chabahar port of Iran is being developed by India. Now the Central Asian Republics will have two options Gwadar and Chabahar. The forthcoming few years are too critical for Pakistan's interests in Central Asia. If Gwadar is efficiently developed, then Pakistan can become energy and trade corridor for the CARs and rest of regional countries. Otherwise, "India is trying her best to restrict Pakistan interests in Central Asia".[36] The strategic relations between CARs and India are also a challenge for Pakistan. India has founded a military base at Farkhar in Tajikistan in May 2002. It has serious consequences for strategic interests of Pakistan in Central Asian Republics.[37] Moreover, since its independence Central Asian Republics have become a focus of attention of big powers like US, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran etc. which lead to New Great Game. It has also created challenges for Pakistan's interests.

The mainstream ruling elites of Central Asian Republics are mostly the USSR Communist Party ex-leaders and members and also Russians ethnic is the major group of CARs, having decisive influence on decision making.[38]As Russia has deep influence in CARs[39] thus her goals in Central Asia could also marginalize the role of Pakistan in Central Asia. Russia has also strong ties with CARs economically,[40] so in the absence of sound relations with Russia, Pakistan would continue to face problems in terms of boosting its engagement and fulfilment of its economic interests in Central Asia.

Whereas the political-system is concerned, CARs are not too much inclined to the religion Islam like Pakistan. They are attracted to secularism and favour the Turkish model. So, Pakistan should be cautious of using the card of Islam in CARs. It is a significant factor which can influence relations between the Pakistan and CARs.[41]

Conclusion

The disintegration of the USSR opened avenues for Pakistan to formulate mutually beneficial relations with the newly independence Central Asian Republics. Policymakers of Pakistan are in the process of formulating a comprehensive foreign policy towards this region in order to fulfil its economic, political and strategic interests but, unfortunately, Pakistan is

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[36] Irum Shaheen, "Importance of Pakistan-Central Asia Relations: Opportunities and Constraints."*International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 1(14), (2011), 222.

[37] Farhat Asif, "Pakistan's Ties with Central Asian States Irritants and Challenges." *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 4(1), (2011), 5.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Cummings Sally N, *Understanding Central Asia*. (London: Routledge, 2012).

[40] Irum Shaheen, "Importance of Pakistan-Central Asia Relations: Opportunities and Constraints."*International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 1(14), (2011), 222.

[41] Ibid, 223.

facing hurdles and irritants in establishing relations with CARs. One major hurdle in fulfilling economic interests of Pakistan is lack of common border for better access to the region. The Wakhan corridor, a 16 km narrow strip, on the north-eastern side of Afghanistan can connect Pakistan with Tajikistan but law and order situation and terrorism in Afghanistan is the main barrier in this regard. Because of unrest in Afghanistan any trade agreement, oil and gas pipeline and electricity transmission line cannot be easily materialized. Pakistan's geographical location can also be utilized as Central Asian energy supply to the other parts of the world. A hope has risen in the shape of China Pakistan Economic Corridor and development of Gwadar port. To fulfil its economic and other interest in Central Asia, Pakistan must develop strong diplomatic ties with CARs, encourage people to people contact, strengthen ECO role, create political good-will and, above all try her best for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan. In case, if aforesaid critical measures are not considered on a serious note in time then every significant economic venture would bypass Islamabad because many other alternatives are available to Central Asian Republics. No doubt, it is impossible for Pakistan to establish good relations and ensure its economic interests in CARs overnight, but, serious efforts are need of the hour.

Recommendations: The Way Forward

- ✓ At present, people to people contacts are not developed which is much needed to fulfil the maximum economic interests of Pakistan in Central Asia. There should be regular exchanges of scholars, government representatives and cultural representatives to develop better mutual understanding. Pakistan should offer scholarships to Central Asian students. It will strengthen bilateral relations.
- ✓ Peace in Afghanistan is prerequisite for rail and road connectivity as well as construction of oil and gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines between CARs and Pakistan. The later should leave no stone unturned for restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan.
- ✓ The revival of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) can also initiate the development of infrastructural projects as transportation and economic connectivity is one of its main objectives. Pakistan and CARs are member of this regional organization.
- ✓ Internal instability would harm Pakistan's interests in abroad. So, Pakistan should work on internal political and economic stability. The internal instability, political uncertainty and economic crisis are huge irritants for Pakistan to have ties with Central Asia.

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INTEGRATION THROUGH LANGUAGE IN THE PAK-AFGHAN BORDERLAND: THE INTERPLAY OF PAST LEGACIES, PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

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Abstract

This paper overviews the genesis, development, decay and legacy of Pashto language policy and planning (LPP) in Pakistan and Afghanistan within the context of borderland. It argues that despite sharing one language, Pashtoons living across Durand Line gradually diverged to integrate respectively in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, support and opposition to Pashto language was politically motivated. The Afghan, British Indian and Pakistani elite used planning and policy for Pashto as an instrument and indicator of political ends. This paper establishes that the development and weakening of Pashto in domains of power is intrinsically dependent on its speakers. Political interests, therefore, made Pashto the center of Pashtoon identity. Current policies in the borderland point to a future where cohesion through language takes place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, acceptance of linguistic diversity as a unifying asset is gradually replacing the earlier fear of viewing it as a threat to unity.

Keywords: Integration, Pashto, Language Policy and Planning (LPP), Borderland, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pashtoon Identity.

Introduction

Pashto speaking people live on the both sides of Pak-Afghan border (Durand line). This borderland region of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains the focus of international interest as war on terror simmers there. It is a socio-culturally heterogeneous and politically volatile region as it has been

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facing challenges such as annexation by various outside powers, foreign ideological and military invasions, and its history is speckled with continuous migrations. These transformations have gravely impacted the residents of this region. Pashtoons sometimes violently and sometimes passively (through assimilation) reacted to these challenges that impacted their socio-economic life including language and culture. The diachronic development of Pashto language policy and planning in Pak-Afghan borderland remains a key to their cordial relations.

Afghanistan is a diverse ethno-linguistic state. According to Summers Institute of Linguistics (SIL International), Afghanistan is home to forty one languages. Among these, twelve languages are seriously threatened, while Pashto and Dari are the strongest.[1] A reliable census has never taken place, and the normal mechanism of sample based surveys is used to estimate the population and speakers of various languages. For instance, CIA (USA) assumes the population of Afghanistan to be roughly 33 million in 2010. Speakers of Dari were estimated to be 50%, Pashto speaking population was estimated to be 35%, and the speakers of Turkic branch languages were estimated to be 11% (Uzbeki and Turkmen were the languages included in this category). The remaining four percent included rest of languages such as Nuristanietc.[2] Besides, Russian, French, German, English, Urdu and Arabic are important languages learnt by Afghans as a second language.[3]

Ethnic Pashtoons are the most numerous in Afghanistan,[4] and they have enjoyed political domination for most of the time in modern Afghanistan.[5] Majority of Pashtoons speak Pashto language.[6] The dominant position of Pashto speakers has caused Pashto language to emerge as the major language of Afghanistan.[7] Pashtoons consider Pashto language a symbol of their identity and culture. After Pashtoon Tajiks are the second major ethnic group who speak Dari language.[8] Both ethnic groups and their languages have enjoyed official and national status. On GIDS (Graded

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1 M. Paul Lewis, Gary F. Simons, and Charles D. Fennig, eds., *Ethnologue: Languages of Afghanistan*, Eighteenth Edition ed. (Dallas, Texas: SIL International, 2015).

2 Central Intelligence Agency, "Afghanistan," last modified July 12, 2016, accessed July 29, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

3 Muhammad Irshad, "Socio-Linguistic Aspects of English in Afghanistan" (University of Peshawar, 2002), 46.

4 Nancy Hatch Dupree and Thomas E. Gouttierre, "Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment," in *A Country Study: Afghanistan* (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor's Pub. Division Library of Congress, 2001).

5 Except for a brief Tajik rule of *Bacha Saqaw* in 1929 and recently by Mujaddidi and Rabbani in 1992-96

6 Barbara Robson and Habibullah Tegey, "Pashto," in *The Iranian Languages*, ed. Gernot Windfuhr (New York: Routledge, 2009).

7 Andrew Dalby, *Dictionary of Languages: The Definitive Reference to More Than 400 Languages*, *Dictionary of Languages: The Definitive Reference to more than 400 Languages* (London: A&C Black Publisher Ltd., 2004), 492.

8 Nassim Jawad, *Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities* (London: Minorities Rights Group International, 1992), 11.

Intergenerational Disruption Scale) developed by Fishman, Dari and Pashto are placed in the best categories in terms of power (socio-political and economic) and vitality.[9]

Pakistan, like Afghanistan, is also a multilingual and multiethnic state. Pakistan is home to seventy three languages[10]and its population in 2017 is 207.7 million.[11] In 2017 census the speakers of Urdu (as their first language) are 7.6%, speakers of Punjabi are 44.2%, speakers of Sindhi are 14%, speakers of Pashto are 15.4%, speakers of Balochi are 3.6%, speakers of Saraiki are 10.5% and speakers of remaining sixty seven minor languages are collectively 4.7%. The greatest percentage of linguistic diversity is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (with twenty languages).[12]

Local historians trace the beginning of Pashtoons to the Iranian Aryan race.[13] Pashtoon settlement in Northwest of India and Southeast of Afghanistan began in fifth century A.D. The formation of a Pashtoon empire by Ahmad Shah Abdali made them the ruling class.[14] Pashtoon gradually increased in number and political significance in the period between their first settlement and emergence of their modern Afghan state.[15] However, when the Afghan empire crumbled, Sikhs conquered Pashtoons populated northern India. English army annexed this part, when they defeated the Sikhs. It was initially ruled as part of Punjab province. Later it was administered by a commissioner and finally it was made a province and a governor was appointed to administer this region. During the revolt of 1857, Pashtoons earned the trust of the colonial rulers, which started a period of preferring their induction in the army of British India. The British raj desired integration of this area with British India, therefore, they promoted Urdu language to replace Persian in courts. While British officers took keen interest in learning Pashto, they discouraged its use in domains of power by Pashto speakers (such as court and formal education) to suppress their nationalist sentiments.[16] Raverty, an officer of the British army, and an orientalist with expertise in Pashto language, proposed that Pashtoons are among the races who can be trusted more than other races of India. He

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[9] Joshua A. Fishman, *Reversing Language Shift* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1991).

[10] SIL International, "Pakistan " SIL International, accessed November 24, 2017. https://www.ethnologue.com/country/PK.

[11] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, *Press Release on Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population and Housing Census-2017*, by Government of Pakistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2017).

[12] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, *Population by Mother Tongue*, by Government of Pakistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2017).

[13] Wahab, Shaista and Barry Youngerman. *A Brief History of Afghanistan*. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2007.pp.37-38

[14] Barbara A. West, *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Asia and Oceania* (Facts On File, Incorporated, 2009), 546-54.

[15] Wahab, Shaista and Barry Youngerman. A Brief History. Op cit. pp.38-44

[16] Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 135-7.

appreciated Pashto language immensely and proposed to make it the official language and medium of instruction. He thought that such a move would help to better integrate Pashtoon in British India.[17] His proposals did not find support among the higher echelon of power, due to their fear of fanning the flames of separatism further by giving such recognition to Pashto language.

Pashtoon is the largest ethnicity in Afghanistan and second large in Pakistan. Their division, a casualty of Anglo-Afghan territorial wars and subsequent treatises was part of the Great Game in the nineteenth century. Their population concentrated around either side of Durand Line, was loosely administered by the British and Afghan governments. This allowed them a degree of autonomy. However, in the twentieth century consolidation of British India and Afghanistan started to erode this autonomy and threatened the political, social, economic and political life of Pashtoons. The effort of these two competing centers to promote consolidation and resulting local responses were multifaceted. Pashto language has been a strong marker of ethnic identity among Pashtoons. Therefore, this language became an important factor in this process of their consolidation into British India (later Pakistan) and Afghanistan.

This paper focuses the development of a language policy that was intended to integrate the Pashtoons in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively. A brief account of the events before the creation of Pakistan is first presented to establish a historical context. Then, the integration of Pashtoons through Language Policy Planning (LPP) by Pakistan and Afghanistan is compared by sketching the realization of competing objectives of these states.

Research Questions and Approach

This paper overviews the genesis, development, decay and legacy of Pashto Language Policy and Planning (LPP) in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As this paper focuses how the borderland Pashtoons integrated into Pakistan and Afghanistan, so it asks:

1. Why support and opposition to Pashto language was politically motivated?
2. Why historically the Afghan, British and Pakistani elite used it or feared it as an instrument and indicator of political ends?
3. What language planning and policies in borderland produced integration of Pashtoons into Afghanistan and Pakistan?

[17] Henry George Raverty, *A Dictionary of the Pukhto, Pushto or Language of the Afghans* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications 2001), i-ix.

This paper provides a qualitative overview of the documents and events related to LPP in the Pak-Afghan borderland. For this purpose, the paper relies mostly on the review of secondary data.

Theoretical Framework

This study is based on a framework that has two components. The first component (discussed in 3.1) provides a linguist's perspective about the role of language in political integration and resistance. The second component (discussed in 3.2) provides the political scientist's perspective where language is seen as part of political process. These mutually converging views would provide an effective way of studying the relation of language and politics peculiar to the context of Pashto within the Pak-Afghan borderland.

Integration in Language Policy and Planning (LPP)

This paper utilizes a Language Policy Planning (LPP) model that relates language to the process of political integration. Language policy planning can be effectively studied when it finds answers to questions such as, "who speaks what language to whom and when".[18]

In this paper the role of Language Policy Planning model in state's daily activities and functions is explained through six interconnected presumptions, which explain the factors and process of intra-state integration. First, it is assumed that nation is like a system of organized fields as described by Lewin[19], Bourdieu[20], Mey[21] and Rummel[22]. The metaphor of eco-system can be offered as another candidate to explain the system of nation. Here, nation means a sovereign national state. Polities can be viewed as eco-system where like biological ecosystem competition, survival and death of language are associated with a number of elements in the habitat.[23] Second, national integration is considered the process of eliminating threats to the stability of nation as system. Third, LPP is supposed as one of the integrative tools in nation as system. LPP includes all formal and informal practices, beliefs,

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[18] Susan Hodgson, M. and Zoe Irving, eds., *Policy Reconsidered: Meanings, Politics and Practices* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007), 92.

[19] Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics [1935-1946]*, ed. Gertrude Weiss Lewin (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948).

[20] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice, *Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[21] Harald Mey, *Field-Theory: A Study of Its Application in the Social Sciences* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972).

[22] Rudolph J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War: The Dynamic Psychological Field* ([Beverly Hills, Calif.] : Sage Publications ; New York, 1975).

[23] Diarmait Mac Giolla Chriost, *Language, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Study of Language in Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Eurasia*, *Routledge Advances in Sociology* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 163-5.

ideologies and interventions related to language. Fourth, identity is taken as layered in the individual speaker of a language. Individuals possess the potential to effectively recognize and prioritize multiple identities according to the appeal of these identities to the real or imagined interests. Fifth, it is assumed that in case of conflict in identities, the one with stronger appeal to the interests of individual is upheld and the other identities are either suppressed or disowned if they conflict with dominant identity. Sixth, homogeneity and diversity are taken as integrative LPP goals within a nation, while conflict between language-groups is considered disintegrative outcome as it produces resistance and/or rejection of an LPP that attempts assimilation.

Linguistic homogeneity as LPP goal can be stated as negative integration when assimilation of the less dominant language groups is the intended goal of language policy. When the promotion of diversity is intended through language policy then such integration can be considered positive integration. Assimilation depends on repressive mechanism that results in language shifts, language deaths, language endangerment, violation of language rights and sociopolitical exploitation. Assimilation is presently an unpopular method of integration for the majority of LPP experts. Accommodation as positive integration results in language maintenance, language rights recognition, cooperation, pluralism and freedom and rights for all language communities. Both positive and negative integration aims at the stability of the state. However, negative integration through the use of coercion and force is prone to elicit the reaction of resistance, grievances and conflict. Power sharing and change in the identity work together in producing integration.



Fig.1. Process of national integration through Language Policy Planning (LPP)

Fig. 1. Shows, the schematic components of the LPP model which describes integration as the product of LPP. The model has two levels, upper and lower. In this model LPP initiates in upper level, is implemented in top-down fashion. This model theorize a resourceful actor (RA) as the first interested actor of LPP who initiates LPP for integrating a target group, where domination/sharing of power remain the primary motive. The nature of language planning is cyclically repeated spanning all aspects of languages.[24] An accommodative intervention in languages results in integration and an unsuccessful or partially successful coercive and repressive assimilation results in alienation, resistance, conflict and disintegration. Actors in LPP can be divided in to resourceful and less resourceful groups. The resourceful and less resourceful actors compete with each other for domination of power domains and enforce an identity favorable to them for participation in these domains.

The Borderland Theory

The available literature regarding the Pak-Afghan borderland mostly focuses the socio-economic and political dimensions of the region but neglects the role of language in these dimensions. Further, it disregards the significance of the unique realities of the borderlands by adopting a state centred approach.[25] Borderland theory by focusing on the local, offers an alternative.[26] The borderland theory considers the state-centred approach flawed[27] and proposes a comprehensive 'cross-border' perspective on border regions. It posits 'borderland' as a force that is based on the networks and the systems of interaction (social, political, economic, and cultural, etc.) across the border and their impact on the bordering states. This makes the study of borderland significant in understanding language as an integrative agent.

It is normal to study border from the perspective of state-center in a modern state where elite of the capital settle the border as cartographic lines driven by an urge to establish the writ of state in all parts of the state. Territories were conquered but not integrated or assimilated along borders in

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[24] Grant D. McConnell, "Global Scale Sociolinguistics," in *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics*, ed. Florian Coulmas (Oxford: Blackwell 1998), 331.

[25] Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Polanyi* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 117-30.

[26] Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderland," *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (Fall 1997); William Van Schendel, "The Making of Bangladesh's Border-the Bengal Border: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia," *Anthem South Asian Studies* (2005), accessed November 20, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802309290.

[27] Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," *Politics and Society* 10 (1980); Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back," in *Bringing the State Back*, ed. P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

early days of modern state. But, in recent times, most modern states attempt integration or assimilation as they consider the heterogeneity of border areas a threat to sovereignty. The elite in the states appear to be unified when they engage in the negotiation and decision making. However, the interests of army, bureaucracy, political leadership, industrialists, landlords and businessmen do not always converge. Therefore, vague and ineffective decisions may be taken and patchily implemented. Such negotiations and policy making is often declared to masses as "national struggle" aimed to build a nation that is politically, socially and culturally uniform, entailing linguistic homogeneity as well. The success or failure of integrating borderlands depends on three elements: (1) resources and will of the state(s), (2) alignment or alienation of elite in the borderland and (3) acceptance or rejection of the population living in the borderland. Figure – 2 shows three possibilities that emerge due to interplay of these elements: (1) borderland is totally assimilated or integrated, (2) it is partially assimilated or integrated and (3) it defeats the assimilation or integration efforts completely.[28]The role of language within the context of borderland theory has been explained and assessed in this paper.



Fig. 2: Power relation of state, local elite and the people of borderland.[29]

[28] Baud and Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderland."
[29] Ibid.

Historical Background of Pashtoon's Autonomy and Pashto Language

The desire of Pashtoon for autonomy dates back to their struggles of resistance to the Persian and Mughal imperialism in the beginning of eighteenth century. As a result of this resistance they successfully established a large empire. This empire resulted in the ascendance of Pashtoons. Rise of Pashtoon dominance and then a slow eclipse provided enough time for Pashtoons to establish their ethnic superiority in the region. The material superiority also translated into a consciousness of the superiority of other identity markers such as language. Pashto language was a mediocre language before this rise. After its rise, Pashtoon leader and poets such as Khushkhal Khan and Rahman Baba made Pashto the medium of their expression and helped in nurturing the national consciousness among Pashtoons. This consciousness was realized through accruing social, political and economic superiority of Pashtoons. However, Persian continued to dominate in domains of power. The emergence of first Sikh and then the British power on eastern border and Persian power on the southern border and Russian in the north and west squeezed Pashtoon influence. Ultimately, the two Anglo-Afghan wars resulted in loss of territory to British India. And Pashtoon population was once more divided (earlier the Mughal and Persian empires did this). British India formalized this division through a treatise in 1893 that laid a permanent boundary between the British India and Afghanistan known as Durand Line. The lost territory especially that was inhabited and controlled by Pashtoons was a thorn in the side of Afghan nationalists. British India was also aware of this desire and took such steps that would keep the British leverage over the Pashtoon and use them to their advantage against the Afghans. This issue thereby acquired three dimensions, one of the great game between Russia and Britain, two the issue of Afghan nationalism and a three a local aspect that became a cocktail of responses (sometimes pro-Afghan and sometime pro-British).

British India adopted the policy of minimum essential control and indirect rule to keep Afghanistan in its fold. In British India Persian was replaced by Urdu as official language of communication between the administration and population with obvious reason to internally consolidate British India and to cut its links with Afghanistan and where Persian was official language.[30] Schiffman finds no sign that the founder of Afghanistan attempted to introduce Pashto as the official language of his kingdom.[31] Afghanistan focused internal consolidation and redefinition of Afghan national identity. Local Pashtoons attempted to make best of this competition between Afghanistan and British India in asserting influence over them.

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[30] Harold F. Schiffman, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors : The Changing Politics of Language Choice*, *Brill's Studies in South and Southwest Asian Languages* (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2012), 10-12.

[31] Ibid., 11.

Afghanistan's Language Policy Planning (LPP) for Pashto

This section overviews how Pashto and Dari as major language related to national integration in Afghanistan especially in the 20th century. A diachronic review traces the development of Afghan treatment of Pashto in the 20th century.

According to Senzil Nawid, "Language policy in Afghanistan was frequently altered in the course of the twentieth century in response to social and political conditions and the effort to promote the political objectives of the regime in power. The objectives were promotion of national unity, national identity, ethnic aspirations, and political ideologies. Afghanistan's turbulent history in the twentieth century occasioned frequent changes in Afghan language policy."[32]

The 20th century Afghanistan was geared towards modernization. The diverse population had different linguistic and social backgrounds. All of them needed to be assimilated and new national identity had to be constructed.[33]In the efforts of modernization Amanullah Khan had the fortune of having Mahmud Tarzi, a gifted Afghan educationist, modernist and nationalist. Mahmud Tarzi may be considered as the first modern education reformer in Afghanistan. His Persian writings specially "Mu'allim-i Hikmat" (Teacher of Wisdom) contains glimpses of a student-centered approach and emphasis on discovery.[34] Ministry of education (that was also related to keeping archives) through its policy laws between 1920 and 1930 made it compulsory for record section to maintain a record of all official documents in Pashto.[35] Initially, *Pashto Tolana* (Society for Pashto) was founded as a branch of "ministry of education" to translate books from foreign languages into Pashto, and was also tasked to improve its vocabulary and propose formal style to make it suitable for performing a role as official language.[36] Sudden increase in activities related to promotion of Pashto language happened after 1919 when the Rawalpindi treatise ended British suzerainty in Afghanistan. Nationalist spirit was at the height, and irredentist claims over the Pashtoon majority territory under British India control were frequently raised in the magazines and newspapers of the time such as Kabul and Siraj-ul-Akhbar. The word Afghan was used aggressively as the unique identity of all citizens of Afghanistan. Though such word, meant the

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[32] Ibid., 31.

[33] Robert D. Crews, *Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation* (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015), 73.

[34] Mahmud Tarzi, *Mu'uallim-I Hikmat Asar-I Mahmud Tarzi* (kabul: Matba'ah-i Hurufi, 1334 AH).

[35] Government of Afghanistan, *Nizamnamah Da Asasi Da Wazarat Mu'arif (Law Governining the Fundamental of Ministry of Education)* (Kabul: Matba'ah-i-Shrikat-i-Rafiq, 1928), 4-11.

[36] Ibid., 16-17.

domination of Pashtoons to the minority languages and ethnicities.[37] As Pashto was standardized, a policy of increasing its role in official communication and education was followed, resulting in enhancement of its sociopolitical prestige and roles.[38] The official support to enhancing the status of Pashto language was repressive for Dari (as it was derided as Persian). It was aimed to substitute Dari by Pashto in the domains of power, thereby make Pashto as the symbol of national identity in Afghanistan.[39]

Before the rise of Pashtoon identity-based nationalism, Persian was language of the court, belle letters, official communication and quality education. This was a common practice in all kingdoms of the region. Therefore, Persian was the lingua franca of the early 20th century Central and South Asia. Pashto was partially used in Afghan military, and before the rise of nationalism the Pashtoon ruling class largely ignored its potential as official language.[40] The son and grandson of Amir Abdur Rahman in search of consolidating Afghanistan as modern state started to see in Pashto an instrumental value that would make Afghanistan, as a national state, different from Persian using neighborhood in British India and Iran.[41] Despite earlier official rhetoric, the decision to replace Dari by Pashto had to wait till 1937. This became the first and the only time that "Pashto Only" language policy was enacted. King Zahir Shah's uncle and the then senior minister Mohammad Hashim Khan expressed his views in an interview to a Western journalist in these words, "from next year it [Pashto] is to become the language of our officials, doing away with Persian. Our legends and our poems will then be understood by everyone. We shall draw from them a pride in our culture of the past which will unite us." [42] Thus, Pashto, which was ranked equally with Dari (Afghan Persian) by the Pashtoon king Amanullah, gained supremacy in 1930s. To promote Pashto as standardized language and "Afghan" national ideology the "*Pashto Tulana"* (Pashtu Academy) was established. The cornerstone of Afghan nationalism was based on the promotion of the Pashto language and Pashtoon culture and values, which remained a major preoccupation in educational system of the

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[37] Sayed Askar Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan : An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

[38] M.A. Miran, "The Function of National Lanuages in Afghanistan," *Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society* 11 (1977): 1.

[39] Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, "The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism, and Their Discontents," in *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World. The Struggle for the Afghan State*, ed. Willem Van Schendel and Erik J. Zurcher (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 155.

[40] Fazal Ghani Mugaddedi, *Afghanistan Dar Ehd-E Alikhazrat Amanullah Khan 1919-1929* (California: Folgergraphics Inc., 1997), 16-7.

[41] Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics : Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, 1st ed., *Contemporary Issues in the Middle East* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 9.

[42] Ella Maillart, "Afghanistan's Rebirth: An Interview with H. R. H. Hashim Khan in 1937," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 27, no. 2 (1940): 225-8.

government of that time.[43] In 1944 decision was taken by ministry of education to switch to Pashto language as medium of instruction at primary level schools and also recognized difficulty in implementation as shortage of textbooks and competent teachers had to be tackled.[44] Other ethno-linguistic groups were panicked by this sudden change in the direction of nation building by the ruling elite.[45] This problem was then addressed through constitutional protections in 1964. In the constitutions of 1964 provision for the official status of Pashto and Dari.[46] In 1964 in response to Pashtoon domination, minority based 'Sitam-e-Milli" was formed, primarily to counter Pashtoon influence. Taher Badakhsi, the leader of this party grouped together Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazara through his political rallying for the rights of the minority ethno-linguistic groups as victim of Pashtoon oppression.[47]

Pakistan's Language Policy Planning (LPP)for Pashto

Pashtoons living in Pakistan, consider their tribal code of hospitality, revenge and chivalry as central to their identity. After their consolidation of power in the borderland their leadership started to consider Pashto as an important component of this tribal identity.[48] Pashtoons of inner India lost their ability to speak Pashto in 18th century AD and used Persian or Urdu instead.[49] Pashtoons in India, especially in the borderland gave significance to the language policy in Afghan courts. As Persian was dominant in Afghanistan till 20th century, the Pashto speaking population along the border also used Persian as official language and gave it importance in education.[50]

However, when resistance to colonial occupation was started by Ghaffar Khan (also known as Bacha Khan) the "red-shirts" or "*Khudai Khidmatgars*" chose to patronize Pashto in their schools. He considered it necessary for the elite to promote Pashto by learning it and using it. In his visit to Afghanistan when he met King Amanullah Khan, he found him less

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[43] Banuazizi and Weiner, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics : Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, 56.

[44] Government of Afghanistan, *Da Kabul Kalani 1323* (Kabul Pukhto Tolani Da Nashriato Sanga, 1944), 65.

[45] Hafizullah Emadi, "Ethnic Groups and National Unity in Afghanistan," *Contemporary Review* (January 1 2002), accessed July 1, 2016, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/EthnicGroupsandNationalUnityinAfghanistan.-a082513925.

[46] Constitution of 1964 of Afghanistan. Accessed April 5, 2008 <http://www.afghanistantranslation.com/Constitutions/Constitution_1964-1343_ET.doc>

[47] Zalmay Khalilzad, "Anarchy in Afghanistan," *Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 1 (1997): 39.& Emadi, "Ethnic Groups and National Unity in Afghanistan."&S. Fida Yunas, "Afghanistan's Minority Nationalities," *Central Asia*, no. 40 (1997): 183.

[48] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, 134.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

proficient in Pashto. He advised the king to learn Pashto language, as language is a key to Pashtoon nationalism.[51] After annexation of their homeland, the rural Pashtoons largely remained egalitarian and independent while the urban Pashtoons became hierarchical (largely through qalang or taxation).[52] As king Amanullah Khan pioneered making Pashto the symbol of Pashtoon identity and nationalism in Afghanistan, so Ghaffar Khan initiated this movement in the borderland on Pakistani side.[53] The rise of Pashto language was inspired by the desire of Pashtoon elite to promote "official nationalism" that necessitated an indigenous "official language". While in Afghanistan Pashto was used as an instrument of national solidarity, in British India the suppression of Pashto was undertaken by the colonial rulers as they suspected such trend the strengthening of anti-colonial rule.[54]

The Contribution of Pashtoon Nationalists

Khudai Khidmatgar movement coalesced around Pashto language that acted as unifying force of Pashtoon nationalism. It began in 1929 in the form of "Anjuman-I-Islahi Afghan" (Society for the reform of Afghans), indicating anti-colonial awakening of Pashtoon that centered on ending the British occupation of Pashtoon homeland.[55] This nationalist and anti-colonial activities merged into a demand for freedom from colonial rule.[56] *Pakhtun* and Islam magazines contents emphasized the role of Pashto in uniting Pashtoons, promoting nationalism in them and making their claim for independence.[57]The borderland area remained largely a frontier during the early days of annexation with British India. Later, in June 1935 British Parliament passed the bill that declared it a province, but the word, "Frontier" still reflected incomplete integration.[58]

Abdul Qayyum Khan, as minster of transferred departments, considered different options for the medium of instructions in 1932. He did not consider Pashto language fit for teaching because teachers and some Pashto speakers favored Urdu over Pashto.[59] However, Qayyum regionalized language policy for education by making Pashto as medium of instruction in Pashto speaking areas, while reserving Hindko for Hindko speaking areas. Non-

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[51] Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan* (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books Ltd., 1969), 50-2.
[52] Akbar S. Ahmad, *Millenium and Charisma among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 70-84.
[53] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, 135.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Khan, *My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan*.
[56] Makulika Bannerji, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 70-100.
[57] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, 139.
[58] John F. Riddick, *The History of British India: A Chronology* (London: Praeger, 2006), 105-24.
[59] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, 139.

Muslim, non-Pashtoon members of legislative assembly termed it "Black Circular" because of its "anti-Hindi-Gurmukhi" nature. Generally when the Pashtoon political elites while in power favored Pashto, and those in opposition stood by minorities in opposing such move. Dr. Khan Sahib led government made Pashto the medium of instruction in Pashto speaking areas. The pre-partition legislative assembly allowed the use of Pashto and Urdu, however, acts were printed only in English.[60]

As the normal approach of the British raj was to suppress Pashto language, the Pashtoon nationalists relied on support from Afghanistan and Swat for Pashto language and its use in education and publications.[61]

Pashto language and nationalism in the nascent states of Pakistan were received with suspicion due to their demand for autonomy. After the fall of eastern wing, in late 1971, the followers of Ghaffar Khan officially made language policy a token of giving up separatist politics when their government turned down a bill to make Pashto the official language of NWFP on May 12, 1972 and instead declared Urdu as the official language. They also assured the government in center that they would work to strengthen Pakistan.[62]

Though officially Pashto was made the medium of instruction in 1952, however, in practice the law was never implemented.[63] The scarcity of resources was always the main issue. In FATA the survey of USAID found that Pashtoon teachers were not available and the non-Pashtoon teachers were not able to teach in Pashto.[64]

Pashto Language and Political Developments after 1978

During a state visit to Islamabad in 1978, president Daoud officially reached an agreement with the president of Pakistan, General Zia ul Haq, to expel the Pakistani separatists from Afghanistan. This may be marked as the end of officially supported hostilities between the two states on the issue. The realization of this agreement did not take place due to the coup d'état and Saur revolution in Afghanistan. Political chaos followed after the entry of Soviet forces. The country quickly dipped into a civil war and a war against foreign forces. The ethno-linguistic nationalism was masked by the spirit of Jihad (as the resistance came to be known collectively as

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[60] Ibid., 140-2.

[61] Senzil K. Nawid, "Language Policy in Afghanistan: Language Diversity and National Unity," in *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice*, ed. Harold F. Schiffman, Brill's Studies in South and Southwest Asian Languages (Leiden, The Netherlands: BRILL, 2011).

[62] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, pp.143-44Ibid.

[63] *Legislative Assembly Database, North West Frontier Province*, by LAD-NWFP (Government of Pakistan, 13 March 1952).

[64] Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, 149.

Mujahideen). The ethno-linguistic lines however were visible in the emergence of these Jihadi factions.

Now, Pakistan was in the position to become party to the internal quagmire in Afghanistan as it hosted a large number of Pashtoon refugees and provided support to the resistance against Soviet forces. Language instead of becoming a force of integration in Afghanistan during this period factionalized the precarious unity. The rise of Pashtoon Taliban and their recognition by Pakistan was a moment of triumph as the borderland started to provide Pakistan a leverage. The subsequent defeat of Taliban tilted the scale in the favor of the non-Pashtoon northern alliance. Lastly, the war on terror and the following slow process of reconstruction left the Pashtoon population in Afghanistan marginalized and deprived. However, the ethno-linguistic minorities in Afghanistan were given larger space they ever enjoyed in the past. The constitution of 2004, in Article 16 recognized the regional official status for Uzbeki, Turkmani, Balochi, Pachaie, Nuristani and Pamiri languages. It also made it the responsibility of the state to promote all languages of Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, the post 9/11 development have brought numerous challenges as the international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State and their affiliate Taliban and myriad of terrorist outfits threaten the existence of state in the borderland. Military operations have been undertaken but they have failed in eradicating the anti-state elements. The militarization, drugs and destruction of the traditional socio cultural setup in Pakistani borderland are the problems that have made the issue of integration a complicated challenge. An important development of the post 9/11 era is the morphing of ethno-linguistic struggle into an obscurantist terrorism in the name of Islam in this borderland.

It is significant, that the separatist tendencies of the politics of Pashto language are now replaced in Pakistan by a movement aimed at provincial autonomy that respects and safeguards the unity of Pakistan. The central government of Pakistan has also ended the policy of mistrust. Pashto language is thriving in Pakistan, and its speakers under the provincial autonomy have been enhanced through 18th constitutional amendment.

The current years are significant as the presence of the US military has decreased in Afghanistan but is also pertinent to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Being integrated in a regional cluster and also having same ethnic community on both sides of the border, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have enmity in this borderland region. In the wake of war on terror, the scenarios drawn for the future of the Pak-Afghan borderland within the context of Pashtoon inhabited borderlands, there are different opinions. Some foresee the violence would return to the politics of Pashto language while others predict a more peaceful turn to these politics.

Conclusion

The issue of nationalist sentiments of Pashtoons emerged due to the British occupation of Pashtoon majority region, which Afghanistan claimed to be its part. However, due to the might of British Empire the irredentist ambition of Afghanistan remained suppressed. The stalemate in the Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 war and the desire to modernize Afghanistan as a national state gave the Afghan elite the enthusiasm to promote Pashto language and Pashtoon identity as the basis of Afghan nationalism. They hoped to integrate the Pashtoon population across border, when the end of British rule was apparent. They financed the subversion of Pakistan as a sate, through their support of separatists. The response of Pakistan was to suppress all aspects of the political activities related to Pashto language; therefore, Pashto language was not officially supported. However, with the end of Afghanistan support, the separatist claim transformed into a non-separatist form, that focused mostly on the promotion of Pashto language as part of provincial autonomy. The chaos in Afghanistan after 1979 has created more complex challenges to both states and the people of the borderland. Promotion of an accommodative language policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been indicated through the constitutional provisions and amendments. However, concrete steps are needed to promote the political and economic integration of the speakers that would ensure a better scope for language to perform a role of positive integration of Pashtoons in both states and make the borderland as an opportunity of promoting regional prosperity offered in the form of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

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BELIEVERS VERSUS INFIDEL FRAMING IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR AND CONFLICT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE WAR ON TERROR IN AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

When we look back and see what happened after the incidents of 9/11- we see that not only USA was successful in making a coalition; Taliban and Osama too were successful in winning the support of people specially in the areas of their influence. One of the reasons was the narrative. Whereas, Bush and his allies mostly used Good Versus Evil and Loss Gain framing- Taliban and Osama were using Believers versus Infidels and Faroun versus Musa (Pharaoh versus Moses) framing to win the support and to convince people to take part in the War on Terror (WOT). This paper explains the way believers versus infidels framing works in time of war and conflict. It focuses on the way believers versus infidel framing worked after 9/11 with special reference to the discourse that was generated in the areas dominated by Taliban. Moreover, it argues that this framing was instrumental in portraying those who carried out the attacks, on 9/11, as heroes and people of faith sacrificing their lives to kill infidels- the framing downplayed the hijacking of planes and killing of thousands of innocent people/ non-combatants.

Keywords: Metaphors, Framing, Believers, Infidels, 9/11, War on Terror, Afghanistan

Introduction

The discourse that was generated after the incidents of 9/11 is very useful in understanding the use of metaphors, framing and reframing in the context of politics, war and conflict- we see a lot of metaphors and frames that shaped the world view of people. USA and her allies mostly used Good versus Evil[1] and Loss Gain framing- the fairy tales were that an evil enemy has attacked the civilized world and it is the duty of the good people to

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1 Sarfraz Khan and Shuja Ahmad. "Good Versus Evil: Argument to Begin Global War on Terror." *Central Asia* (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2009)

defeat it- Fighting and winning this war is gain, not fighting the war is loss. They were quite successful in winning the support of the citizenry and other nations of the world. Taliban too were successful in winning the support of people especially in the areas of their influence. One of the reasons was the narrative- Taliban and Osama were using Believers versus Infidels and Faroun versus Musa framing to win the support and to convince people to take part in the War on Terror.

The first part of the paper briefly discusses Metaphors, Frames and Framing. It explains the way believers versus infidels framing works. It also argues that this framing is not new; it has always been instrumental in shaping public opinion in times of war and conflict. The second part of the paper, taking into account the discourse that was generated in the context of 9/11, focuses the way this framing worked after 9/11 with special reference Osama and Taliban. Moreover, it is argued that framing the attack on World Trade Center and other places as an attack on infidels highlighted the people who carried out the terrorist attacks as heroes who were sent by God- As if they sacrificed their lives in service of the religion. The framing downplayed that they actually hijacked the planes and killed thousands of innocent people/ noncombatants.

Metaphors, Frames and Framing

Metaphor/Metaphorical understanding means,"…understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another."[2]

We understand: Arguments in terms of War; Life in terms of Journey; Time in terms of Money- banks have *branches*, countries are *persons/families*, ideas are *food*, enemies are *evil*, love is *fire* etc. Kövecses defines a metaphor as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another[3]: target domain and source domain. We understand target domain in terms of the source domain. In, 'He *demolished* my argument', the metaphor is Argument is War- Argument is the target domain and the source domain is War. In, 'Look how far we have *come'*, the metaphor is Love is a Journey- the target domain is love and Journey is the source domain. Similarly, when we say, 'We send our *sons and daughters* to foreign lands to fight for us'; the metaphor is, A Country is a Family- Soldiers are sons and daughters.

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[2] Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live By*. (The University of Chicago Press, 1980): 5

[3] Kövecses, Zoltán. *Metaphors: A Practical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 4

Fillmore explains a frame as,

> *By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available*.[4]

For example: Hospital- It is not just a word rather a system of concepts such as doctors, patient, nurses, beds, blood test and others tests, operation, operation theater, cardiac ward and other wards etc. When someone says *operation theater* they whole frame of hospital will be evoked. Similarly, when we listen to the word *War* everything related to war automatically comes in our mind- the word *waiter* evokes the whole frame of a restaurant. Lakoff defines a frame as a conceptual/mental structure that shapes our world view. He writes,

> *Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions*.[5]

Moreover, meaning of words and sentences also depend on frames,

> *... the conceptual frames that inhabit our cognitive unconscious contribute semantically to the meanings of words and sentences*.[6]

This explains that meaning of words and sentences are defined and understood relative to their respective frames. Moreover, truth or falsity of a sentence may also be determined on the basis of a frame. Consider this: Our enemy is helping us. No one will accept this statement since *enemy* frame and *help* frame cannot go together- this is not the way we see our enemy- this is not the way we think the world is. But we do not see any problem when someone says: My friends are helping me.

Framing plays a very important role in politics. Politicians and people in power, using metaphors, can frame an event/situation in such a way that citizenry don't even think about other dimensions of the problem. They select and prioritize some facts, images and developments about an event or

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[4] Fillmore Charles J. Frame. "Semantics: Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Reading": edited by Dirk Geeraerts, (Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006): 273, (originally published in 1982 in *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*, Linguistic Society of Korea (ed.), 111-137. Seoul: Hanshin publishing. Reprinted with permission) (accessed June 22, 2009)

[5] George Lakoff, "Don't think of an Elephant!" (Vermont: Chelsea Green, 2004): xv

[6] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *"Philosophy in the Flesh- The Embodied Mind and its Challenges to western Thought",* (Basic Books): 116

issue over others, this way they promote one particular interpretation of an event and ordinary people cannot notice this.[7]

In the context of war and conflict farming plays a very important role. Mostly, the response of citizenry, their support or condemnation and degree of disapproval depends on the framing being used. Moreover, the decision to take part, both physically and financially, in a conflict or war depends on how the situation has been framed.

Similar to Good versus Evil framing is Believers versus Infidels. What is true for good versus evil is mostly true for believers versus infidels. However, more religious diction has to be used in framing a war, a struggle between believers and infidels. The following discussion attempts to explain the way believers versus infidels framing works in times of war and conflict.

President Franklin Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, said that Nazis recognize no God except Hitler. Like communists they ruthlessly deny God. They are threatening even our right of worship. He said

> *Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom -- between pagan brutality and the Christian ideal. We choose human freedom -- which is the Christian ideal. No one of us can waver for a moment in his courage or his faith*.[8]

In another speech he narrated the story that if Hitler wins he has planned to abolish all existing religions of the world. This message was for the Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Mohammedan, Buddhist, and Jewish i.e., almost all the believers. Moreover, he informed, that property of all the churches will be detained by the Reich and its puppets.

> *In the place of the churches of our civilization, there is to be set up an international Nazi church…In the place of the Bible, the words of Mein Kampf will be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ. And in place of the cross of Christ will be put two symbols -- the swastika and the naked sword. A god of blood and iron will take the place of the God of love and mercy*.[9]
>
> *With Thy blessing, we shall prevail over the unholy forces of our enemy*.[10]

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[7] Norris Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, "Framing Terrorism*"* in Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, *Framing Terrorism- The News Media, the Government and the Public*, (New York: Routledge, 2003): 11

[8] Roosevelt Franklin, "*We Chose Human Freedom*" May 27, 1941: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Radio Address Announcing the Proclamation of an Unlimited National Emergency. Retrieved from http://www.usmm.org/fdr/emergency.html, accessed March 16, 2010

[9] Roosevelt Franklin, "*The forward march of Hitler and of Hitlerism can be stopped -- and it will be stopped*." (October 27, 1941) Retrieved from http://www.usmm.org/fdr/kearny.html, accessed March 16, 2010

[10] Roosevelt Franklin, *D- Day prayer*, (June 6, 1944). Retrieved from http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/fdr-prayer.htm, accessed March 16, 2010

All this narrates that infidels/non believers/enemies of God and religion have planned to conquer the world. Their god is Hitler, their holy book is Mein Kampf, and their religious symbols are swastika and naked sword. Moreover, Hitler is defined as 'god of blood and iron': a persuasive definition, enough to evoke fear and hatred. Words that evoke infidel/non believers frame in the above excerpts are: 'human slavery', 'pagan brutality', 'abolish all existing religions', 'Reich and its puppets', 'international Nazi church', 'Mein Kampf', 'swastika and the naked sword', 'god of blood and iron' and 'unholy forces'. Words that evoke believers frame are: 'human freedom', 'Christian ideal', 'courage', 'faith', 'Protestant', 'Catholic', 'Hindu', 'Mohammedan', 'Buddhist', and 'Jewish', 'churches', 'our civilization', 'the Bible', 'Holy Writ', 'cross of Christ', 'God', 'love' and 'mercy'. The metaphorical understanding of his speeches was: Believers all over the world are in danger. If infidels win then they will lose even their right to worship. Churches and other holy places will be replaced by international Nazis churches. Holy religious symbols like cross of the Christ will be replaced by swastika and naked sword- only lawlessness and brutality will rule. The world has been divided into two halves: one dominated by pagan brutality and the other by Christian ideal. Moreover, these unholy forces want to dominate the world ruled by Christian Ideals. To avoid all this believers of the world must unite and defeat the enemy.

On December 24, 2002, Saddam Hussain in Christmas message used, 'evil' four times framing America, Britain, and their allies, evil and infidel. He argued that infidel/evil forces of the world want to dominate the world. He said,

> *…the headquarters of evil have begun looking for a new means… our resilient people, in all their faiths, Muslims, Christians and others, take today a strong stand of dignity and pride, armed with faith and high self-confidence, relying on Allah the all-powerful, as they face up to those who have neither faith, nor shame, trustworthiness, conscientiousness, or even the most basic of human values.*[11]

Headquarters of allied forces have been defined in a very persuasive manner, 'headquarters of evil'. Supporters of Saddam, on the other hand, are resilient people of all faiths who rely on God having high self- confidence. Words that framed America, Britain, and their allies, infidel/evil are: 'forces of evil and dark', 'instability', 'chaos', 'dissent', 'antagonism', 'tension', 'hegemonise', 'lies', 'deception', 'fabrication', 'false accusation', 'threats', 'military aggression', 'inflicted', 'unjust blockade', 'hidden agendas',

[11] Saddam Hussain, *Saddam Christmas Message: Excerpts*. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2604699.stm , accessed March 14, 2010

'wickedness', 'perfidy', 'wicked goals', 'headquarters of evil', 'enemies of Allah and humanity', 'injustice', 'aggression', 'wickedness of the evil-minded', 'Satan'. Moreover, he portrayed himself and his friends, good people/believers who were fighting against satanic forces. Words at work are: 'great people', 'people of our glorious Arab nation', 'Christians', 'honourable people', 'mankind', 'Jesus Christ', 'Son of Mary', 'Prophet Muhammad son of Abdullah', 'Prophets', 'prayers and peace', 'peace loving people', 'sincerity', 'great people of Iraq', 'reliance on Allah', 'Jihad', 'justice, human values', 'holly faith in Islam', 'noble objectives', and 'honourable aspirations'.[12]

This reveals that Saddam Hussain portrayed himself and his supporters, believers, and his enemies, infidel evils. The metaphorical understanding and framing of his war discourse had been: infidels of the world have made an alliance to dominate the world, to control the world's future and fortune. These forces of evil are enemies of God. They, neither have faith, nor shame, or conscientiousness. Moreover, they do not have the most basic human values. One cannot trust them. Believers of the world must unite and fight them. God will help believers and enemies of God will be defeated. Any criticism of Saddam's policies would have entailed siding infidels.

Saddam Hussain, in another address to the nation, said,

> *But when evil comes, armed with deceit and destruction, we must face them with faith and holy struggle in a manner which dignifies us and satisfies God…. Hit them so that good and its people reign and evil evicted back to its place….*[13]

Once again, he framed the war, a war between believers and enemies of God. Enemy who is armed with deceit and destruction will be defeated by people who will face the enemy with faith and holy struggle.

Believers versus Infidels in the Context of the WOT in Afghanistan

In War on Terror, President Bush and his allies framed the discussion of war, as a war between good and evil. Taliban and Osama framed the discussion of war, as a war between believers and infidels. This way they persuaded people to fight back in Afghanistan shaping their judgment, perception and behavior. Following are some excerpts to demonstrate the way Taliban and Osama framed the war as believer versus infidel:

> *Hypocrisy stood in force behind the head of infidels worldwide, behind the cowards of this age, America and those who are with it. These events have divided the whole world into two sides. The side*

[12] For more details, see *Saddam Christmas Message Excerpt*

[13] Saddam Hussain, 24, March 2003. Retrieved from www.gaurdian.co.uk, accessed on September 24, 2009

> *of believers and the side of infidels, may God keep you away from them. Every Muslim has to rush to make his religion victorious. The winds of faith have come.*[14]

'Hypocrisy', 'infidel', 'traitors', 'cowards', etc., are words that evoke infidel frame, and with infidel frame comes into action a whole range of knowledge, understanding, expectations and plans etc. Infidels do not believe in God, do not have any sense of morality especially religious, do not believe in Prophets and in the world here after, neither believe in hell nor heaven, do not believe in accountability before God and are possessed by evil and infidelity. This infidelity does not let them see, understand and know the world as God wants us to.

Osama's conceptual understanding of war divides the world into two halves. This also rules out any possibility of a neutral place. God is with believers. The entailment effects are: if you are with Osama, then God is with you, all your actions are good and it is your religious responsibility to fight this war. However, if you are against him then you are with Bush, the representative of infidels, and you are fighting against God.

The only country that can be declared an Islamic state, according to Osama, is Afghanistan for he informed,

> *Only Afghanistan is an Islamic country. Pakistan follows the English law. I don't consider Saudi Arabia an Islamic country*.[15]

The only place, in the whole world, ruled by believers is Afghanistan. This framing excludes even Pakistan and Saudi Arabia from the land of believers. However, in fact, Saudi Arabia, governed on the basis of Sharia (Islamic law). Preamble of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan declares that Muslims of Pakistan shall be allowed to live their lives according to teachings and requirement of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Moreover it proclaims,

> *Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah alone.*[16]

Omer in an interview framed Afghan government, a government of wrong doers. He said,

> *We will not accept a government of wrong-doers. We prefer death than to be a part of an evil government.*[17]

The Afghan government is defined as a 'government of wrong doers'. A

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[14] Osama Bin Laden, *Osama Bin Laden Speeches*, (October 7, 2001). Retrieved from http://www.september11news.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm, accessed on January 22, 2010

[15] Hamid, Mir, *Osama claims he has nukes: if US uses N- Bombs it will get same response*, (November 10, 2001). Retrieved from www.dawn.com , accessed on November 22, 2009

[16] Mazhar-Ul Haq, *The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Bookland, 2003): 19-20

[17] Mullah Omer, *Interview with Mullah Omer*. (November 15, 2001). Retrieved from www.bbc.co.uk, accessed February 23, 2007

persuasive definition indented to evoke negative sentiments against it. Moreover, it is an evil government too- A government of evil wrong doers i.e., infidels. The entailment effects are obvious: anyone who supports it is also a wrong- doer and an infidel. However, people who are fighting against afghan government are good people of faith.

> *There is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots. Its greatest buildings were destroyed, thank God for that. Our nation (the Islamic world) has tasted this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds. When God blessed one of the groups of Islam, vanguards of Islam, they destroyed America*.[18]

The framing of 9/11 events is that it was God who hit the towers. 'God hit America', is a metaphorical understanding of incidents of 9/11- America, a Person, hit on his 'softest spots' by God. The entailment effects are: whoever has done it was servant/sent by God. They gave their lives in service of God. And whoever was attacked was infidel and evil i.e., enemy of God. This way the events were defined and framed. This framing hides the civilian causalities and highlights divine retribution.

They have been degrading and humiliating believers and now they have faced the consequence. 'Believers', 'sons were killed', 'sanctuaries were attacked' evokes believer frame. The definition of the group who carried out 9/11 incidents, is: God blessed group of Islam. This framing hides that they hijacked the planes and killed mostly innocent people/ non-combatants and highlights that they were heroes who died while doing a great service for God and for believers. Moreover, it blocks criticism of those who carried out the attacks since the criticism will make one infidel.

Muhammad Tahir said in a CD,

> *Twin towers were hit on head by an Angel, for this had not been humanly possible to demolish such a construction, I believe*.[19]
> (My Translation)[20]

A metaphorical understanding of the 9/11 events giving it a new meaning- Either the 'group of blessed' was a 'group of angels' or angles were helping the group for it was not 'humanly possible' to put such a

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[18] Osama Bin Laden, *Osama Bin Laden Speeches*. (October 7, 2001) Retrieved from http://www.september11news.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm, accessed January 22, 2010

[19] Muhammad Tahir. *World Trade Center* (CD)

[20] Taliban after October 7, 2001 do not have a formal media. They communicate in local languages through FM or through audio and video cassettes, CDs and small pamphlets. They, in order to win public support, distribute this material in areas where possible support is available. Most of the material about what they say is from such cassettes and CDs. Usually, these CDs and audio cassettes have no names.

destruction on infidels. Whatever the case may be, it was a great sacrifice for and of believers. Again- this framing downplayed the hijacking and killing of innocent people.

> *When the sword comes down (on America), after 80 years, hypocrisy rears its ugly head. …The least that can be said about those people is that they are debauched. They have followed injustice. They supported the butcher over the victim, the oppressor over the innocent child. …the head of infidels worldwide, Bush, and those with him. They have come out in force with their men and have turned even the countries that belong to Islam to this treachery, and they want to wag their tail at God, to fight Islam, to suppress people in the name of terrorism*.[21]

'Sword comes down' (from up) means come from God. 'ugly', 'hypocrisy', 'debauched', 'injustice', 'butcher', 'oppressor over innocent', 'infidel', 'treachery', 'wag their tail', 'fight Islam' all evoke infidel frame. War on terror is actually a war to suppress innocent victims/ believers- Islam. Moreover, any country that is supporting infidels is deceiving and betraying believers and is fighting against Islam. This evokes, 'either you are with us/believers or against us/infidels' framing. Conceptual understanding of the war is that it is a war between followers of God and infidels.

> *I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God, the other is that of Bush. The promise of God is that my land is vast. If you start a journey on God's path, you can reside anywhere on this earth and will be protected... The promise of Bush is that there is no place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find you. We will see which one of these two promises is fulfilled*.[22]

Entailment effects of this framing are: God has promised us that He will protect us- Strongly evokes Infidel versus Believer frame. It demonstrates that we believers will be protected by God. Enemy of God, Bush, the leader of evil infidels, has made a promise that is contradictory to God's promise. Whoever, will help Taliban, is fulfilling God's Promise and is also believer/good. However, whoever helps Bush is an infidel and a supporter of infidel/evil.

> *Almighty God... is helping the believers and the Muslims. God says he will never be satisfied with the infidels. In terms of worldly affairs, America is very strong. Even if it were twice as strong or twice that, it could not be strong enough to defeat us. We are*

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[21] Osama Bin Laden, *Osama Bin Laden Speeches*. (October 7, 2001). Retrieved from http://www.september11news.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm, accessed on January 22, 2010

[22] Mullah Omar, *Mullah Omer- In His own Words*, (September 26, 2001). Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/26/afghanistan.features11, accessed on January 22, 2010

confident that no one can harm us if God is with us.[23]

Since God is with Taliban and Taliban are fighting a great evil power; therefore, they are good. No matter how much strong the enemy of infidels may be it cannot fight and defeat believers.

The infidels, Jews, crusaders, and Hindus are killing Muslims and they play with our honor.[24] (My translation)

The list of infidel evil comprises: Jews, crusaders and Hindus etc. They are defined as people who play with the honor of Muslims- A persuasive definition that evokes sentiments of hatred and revenge. 'Honor' evokes a frame in Pakhtun Culture. It is one of the most cherished ideal. Pakhtuns can sacrifice their lives for honor. An attack on honor triggers revenge.

Molvi Jumma khan evoking believers versus infidels informed:

Believers have always dominated infidels. They have never been dominated by them. This government [Karzai's Government] does whatever infidels want. Don't obey this government.[25] (My Translation)

After framing enemy as infidel and evil, one of the entailment effect is whoever works for, and serve enemy is also infidel (in the context of war on terror, most probably, he is referring to Hamid Karzai). The government supported by America is also infidel and a government of traitors. It is polluting the minds of people making them immoral and irreligious. Zarb-e Momin writes on November 22-28, 2006, America has filled Afghan welfare institutes with liquor. American and her Afghan allies drink and enjoy liquor. On November 22-28, 2006, the same news paper informs: in order to spread nudity and pornography, the Karzai government has made the cable system very common. It has also opened western style beauty parlors to gain aid from western countries. This entails that: Karzai government is supporting infidels and making people infidel. Moreover, western countries give aid to get us away from our own culture and religion and want to spread their own culture and religion in Afghanistan. This evokes very negative sentiments, hatred and revenge, for this informs that our culture and honor are under attack

We will fight the infidels- oh Muslim, come and take part in Jihad.[26] (Translation from poetry)

There were lots of poems and songs that portray allied forces as forces of infidel, evil enemy and people were persuaded to kill them. These poems evoked the frame of the Paradise saying that whoever will die in this war

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[23] Mullah Omar, *Mullah Omer- In His own Words*. (September 26, 2001)
[24] Sheik Dost Muhammad, *Nooristan War* (CD)
[25] Molvi Jumma Khan, *Nooristan War* (CD)
[26] *Nooristan War*

will go to the Paradise. This way, suicide bombers were trained too, telling them stories of Hoor (Arabic, meaning beautiful girls in the Paradise) and life on Paradise full of joys a human being can think of.

Don't let them go ghazis- teach them a lesson worst than Vietnam.[27]
(My translation from poetry)

Words evoking intense feelings of pride and revenge- Such poems told the people that they were more courageous/brave than anyone else on earth, for God's help is with us. The common words to evoke bravery and revenge are: 'Loins of God', 'Servants of Prophet', 'Ghazi' (From Arabic, meaning returnee alive from Jihad), 'Ghyratmand/ghyratee' (From Pashto, meaning honorable man), and 'Mujahideen' (Singular, Mujahid, from Arabic, meaning Holy warrior).

Words that evoke evil and infidel frames in such poems were: 'Faroun', 'Yazid' (From Arabic, The Muslim caliph in whose reign Hussain, Prophet Muhammad's grandson, was martyred), 'Kafir' (From Arabic, meaning Infidel, non believer), 'Munafiq' (From Arabic, meaning Hypocrite), 'Zalim' (From Arabic, meaning Oppressor), 'Murtad' (From Arabic, meaning Apostate), Army of 'Dajjal' (From Arabic, meaning Anti Christ), 'people of hell', etc.

For every Faroun there is a Musa (Moses)…. This new Faroun has claimed that he is God and his strength is his magic i.e. technology.[28] (Translation)

A very common way in a religious context is to frame infidel/evil enemy as Faroun, this evokes Faroun versus Moses. The metaphorical understanding of Faroun versus Moses is: If a person's enemy is like Faroun then that person is like Moses; since, for every Faroun there is a Moses. The allied army is an army of Faroun, since Taliban are fighting against them they are army of Moses. Entailment effects are very clear: whoever will side Taliban will actually side Moses and God, and will go to paradise if they die during the war- whoever is fighting against Taliban is actually a supporter of Faroun and will go to hell.

President Bush in his addresses claimed that Taliban wants us to change our way of life. Taliban also have the same complaint.

America wants us to change our lives and accept their religion…. On September 11 magic of America has come to an end.[29]
(My translation)

One can notice that Taliban are also complaining that enemy wants them to change their way of life. Magic of America evokes Faroun frame.

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[27] *Da Ghaziano Ka*rwan (CD)
[28] Muhammad Tahir. (World Trade Center)
[29] Muhammad Tahir.

Conclusion

The discussion reveals that in times of war and conflict believer versus infidel framing is a very common persuasive narrative. Leaders in times of war use this framing to gain public support. Moreover, this discussion demonstrates that believer versus infidel framing was instrumental in shaping the judgments, perception and behavior of the people in the context of 9/11 and the War on Terror. It was also instrumental in gaining support and blocking criticism/opposition- Critics of believers were dubbed as infidels. The entailment effects of believer versus infidel framing in the context of 9/11 and the WOT in Afghanistan had been:

I. Enemy of believer is infidel. Their power is their magic- the technology they have. Their power comes from evil.
II. Enemy of infidel is inherently believers. Their power comes from God. God only help believers. Moreover, God has promised that He will protect believers.
III. Supporters of believers are good and supporters of infidel are infidels. If a Muslim supports infidel then he/she is a traitor.
IV. Hell is waiting for infidels while believers will go to Heaven- no question about that.
V. People who carried out the attacks on World Trade Center and other places on 9/11 were servants of God/ send by God/ who sacrificed their lives for a very great cause.

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THE VISION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE THREE ASIAS: THE ROLE OF ECO AND SAARC

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Abstract

This paper will examine the vision of regional cooperation in the three Asias by analyzing the need of transforming SAARC and ECO as functional organizations so that the two can be useful for promoting meaningful cooperation in Central, South and West Asia. The regions of Central, South and West Asia are strategically, economically and politically relevant and important when one talks about the concept of three Asias. Regional cooperation is not a pipe dream but a major requirement for ensuring social and human development of people living in a particular region. Ideas, concepts, approaches and theories about regional cooperation and regionalism primarily emerged in the West, but it is in the Third World Countries or global South where connectivity and linkages in people, goods, services and capital became a need and a necessity with the passage of time. Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only two countries having their membership in SAARC and ECO and without their cogent role the vision to promote regional cooperation in the three Asias cannot be transformed into a reality.

Keywords: Regional cooperation, regionalism, three Asias, civil society networks, connectivity, good governance

Introduction

The modern concept of regional cooperation emerged after the end of the Second World War and got an impetus as a sequel to the process of decolonization of Asia and Africa by the European imperial powers. Whereas, regionalism, called as the wave of the future, institutionalized the process of regional cooperation since 1950s. Initially, regional cooperation

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had a limited scope and understanding but with the passage of time and back to back changes in the International system, the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa felt the concept useful for augmenting the process of development and progress in their respective regions.

This paper will examine the vision of regional cooperation in the three Asias by analyzing the need of transforming SAARC and ECO as functional organizations so that the two can be useful for promoting meaningful cooperation in Central, South and West Asia. The regions of Central, South and West Asia are strategically, economically and politically relevant and important when one talks about the concept of three Asias. Regional cooperation is not a pipe dream but a major requirement for ensuring social and human development of people living in a particular region.

Ideas, concepts, approaches and theories about regional cooperation and regionalism primarily emerged in the West, but it is in the Third World Countries or global South where connectivity and linkages in people, goods, services and capital became a need and a necessity with the passage of time.

Following questions will be responded in this paper.

1. What is regionalism and how regional cooperation is *viewed* in Central, South Asia and West Asia?
2. What is the concept of three Asias and how regional cooperation can *unleash* the process of peace and stability in Central, South and West Asia?
3. How SAARC and ECO can help build *bridges* in the three Asias?
4. What are the prospects and impediments for the *vision* of regional cooperation in three Asias?

The common characteristics of the three Asias pose a pertinent question: why there is lack of proper connectivity, meaningful cooperation in economic, trade, commercial and in other areas of cooperation in the three regions? Yet, the vision of regional cooperation cannot take off in the three Asias unless the two organizations representing the three regions i.e. South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Economic Cooperation Organizations (ECO) are made functional and meaningful in their activities. SAARC, which was established by seven countries[1] of South Asia in December 1985, is still grappling with internal conflicts which tend to impede the process of regional cooperation. Likewise, ECO which was established in November 1992[2] by including seven more countries in its fold

[1] Afghanistan became the eight member of SAARC in April 2007.

[2] Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which was composed of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey was non-functional after the Iranian revolution of February 1979 and was revived under a different name of Economic Cooperation Organization by the three members of RCD in 1985. Following the disintegration of Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asian Republics from the tutelage of Moscow, six countries of Central Asia joined ECO viz: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan also became a member of ECO following its enlargement in November 1992.

is unable to proceed for viable cooperation among the member states. When ECO and SAARC are not proactive in implementing their respective charters, how can one expect the two to proceed for cooperation with each other while identifying common goals and objectives. Some of the members of ECO like Pakistan and Afghanistan are simultaneously in SAARC which establishes linkages between South, West and Central Asia.

Regionalism also got a boost after the formation of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 but the uphill task of regional cooperation through connectivity in South and Central Asia is a major reality. SAARC was established in December 1985 and ECO in its present form came into being in November 1992. Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only two countries having their membership in SAARC and ECO and without their cogent role the vision to promote regional cooperation in the three Asias cannot be transformed into a reality. It is also argued by the proponents of the concept of three Asias that unless there is peace and stability in Afghanistan, one cannot expect the process of regional cooperation and regionalism to take off in the three regions because of its borders with the three Asias. How the two regional organizations can play a meaningful role in bringing Central, South and West Asia together and connected is the essence of this paper and will be discussed in detail.

Regional Cooperation and Regionalism

Regional cooperation is the first step to institutionalize the process of regionalism provided the stakeholders are aware and conscious of the conditions and requirements. Regional organizations represent the practical shape of regionalism. Therefore, "Regional organization is a segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, or political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in intergovernmental agreements."[3] Six major requirements of regional cooperation which are also relevant in case of three Asias are as follows:

1. Political will and determination to be expressed on the part of those who want meaningful regional cooperation and a proactive approach to support the concept of regionalism.
2. Dynamic and bold leadership with clear vision without contradictions in theory and practice.
3. Step by step measures to ease restrictions on the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Proper planning is required to

[3] "Varieties of Regionalism" in A. LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations* (Sixth Edition) (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995): 230

unleash the process of soft borders while encouraging trade with minimum curbs.

4. The role of non-governmental sector to support the process of regional cooperation. Only regional cooperation at the governmental level cannot yield positive results unless the corporate sector is also engaged in this regard.
5. Meaningful cooperation in education, culture, science & technology. This would require not only exchange of ideas and concepts but also the sharing of expertise and skills to promote interaction among students, teachers and civil society groups.
6. Steps to promote meaningful connectivity at the popular level and the easing of Visa restrictions. Without lifting curbs on people to people interaction the process of regional cooperation and regionalism cannot be unleashed.

Yet the goal of regional cooperation cannot be accomplished without pursuing a practical approach by those who are supposed to transform ideas into reality. Whereas, regionalism is a concept which integrates all the essential requirements of regional cooperation as it happened in case of European Union. Andrew Hurrel, in his article, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics' argues that,

> *Both 'region' and 'regionalism' are ambiguous terms. The terrain is contested and the debate on definition has produced little consensus. Regionalism was often analyzed in terms of social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage), economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, economic complementarities), political cohesiveness (regime type, ideology) and organizational cohesiveness (existence of formal regional institutions). Regionalization can involve increasing flows of people, the development of multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes and ways of thinking spread from one area to another, and the creation of a transnational regional civil society*.[4]

Amitav Acharya in his article, "Asia Is Not One" published in *The Journal of Asian Studies* argues that "Regionalism, as it is understood in the political science and international relations literature implies the deliberate act of forging a common platform, including new intergovernmental organizations and transnational civil society networks, to deal with common challenges, realize common objectives, and articulate and advance a common identity."[5] Furthermore, on the emergence of regionalism, Edward

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[4] Andrew Hurrel, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics" in *Review of International Studies*, 21(4) (October 1995): 333-334

[5] Amitav Acharya, "Asia Is Not One" *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 69(4) (November 2010): 1002

D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner are of the opinion that, "Since World War II, states have continued to organize commerce on regional basis, despite the existence of a multilateral economic framework. The most recent wave of regionalism has arisen in different context than earlier episodes. It emerged in the wake of the Cold War's conclusion and the attendant changes in interstate powers and security relations."[6]

According to the *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, "Regionalism is to a region what nationalism is to nation. A complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrates the individual and collective minds of people(s) upon what they perceive as their region. Regionalism exists both within states and between states. Within states it can be one manifestation of ethnic nationalism and the political goal of separation and independence. On the other hand, regionalism may simply reflect organizational desire to increase efficiencies and make administration more accountable to the population. [7]" How far such ideas can transform into practice is an uphill task of the protagonists of regional cooperation and regionalism.

Further elaboration of regionalism is given by Martin Griffiths and Terry O' Callaghan in *Key Concepts in International Relations* that "the term refers to intensifying political and/or economic process of cooperation among states and other actors in particular geographic regions, although it is most often discussed in the context of trade flows. At least since the beginning of the 1980s, the world economy has become more and more tripolar, with more than 83 per cent of world trade concentrated in the three regions: East Asia, Western Europe, and North America. Regionalism can develop from below i.e. from the decisions by companies to invest and by people to move within region or from above."[8] Furthermore, according to Merriam-Webster dictionary, regionalism means, "consciousness of and loyalty to a distinct region with a homogenous population. Development of a political or social system based on one or more such areas."[9] According to English Oxford Living Dictionary, regionalism is "theory or practice of region rather than central systems of administration or economic, cultural, or political affiliations. A linguistic feature peculiar to a particular region and not part of the standard language of a country."[10] According to Encyclopedia Princetoniensis, "regionalism refers to three distinct elements:

1. movements demanding territorial autonomy within unitary states;

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[6] Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism" *International Organizations*, 53(3), (Summer 1999): 598, 600

[7] Graham Evans, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1998): 474.

[8] Terry O' Callaghan , *Key Concepts in International Relations*, (London: Routlegde, 2004): 273-74

[9] Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regionalismaccessed, accessed on May 27, 2017

[10] Retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/regionalism, accessed on May 27, 2017.

2. the organization of the central state on a regional basis for the delivery of its policies including regional development policies and
3. political decentralization and regional autonomy.

The first may be seen as 'bottom-up regionalism, the second as 'top-down regionalism and the third as a response to the first".[11] The same source further states that "Regionalism in the sense identified here is a product of the west European state. In international relations it refers to something quite different groupings of states such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Area or the Association of South East Asian Nations. This is because these states have not had the same experience since the Second World War and the various meanings of the region have not converged. Elsewhere in the world the idea exists but in a less developed form, and mainly referring to regional development policies rather than self-government".[12] Hence, three waves of regionalism emerged in the last 150 years. The first generation of regionalism originated in the Western hemisphere when in April 1948 Organization of American States (OAS) was established comprising the countries of North, Central and South America with its headquarters in Washington DC. Furthermore, in the first wave of regionalism, the concept was extended to Western Europe when the treaty of Rome of 1957 created European Economic Community (EEC) composed of six countries viz. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. Since 1957 till 1993, several European countries joined EEC. In November 1993 the Maastricht treaty led to the formation of European Union thus replacing the EEC and giving a semblance of vision of Common European Home and United States of Europe.

The second wave of regionalism is referred to the emergence of regional organizations in Asia when in 1967 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed by six countries namely, Bureau, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore with its headquarters in Manila[13]. Ideas promoting cooperation at the economic, political, cultural and security level made their inroads in different regions of Asia. In 1981 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) a security oriented regional organization composed of six countries of Persian Gulf namely, Bahrain, Muscat & Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates was formed. In 1985 two regional organizations were established in the three Asias. The first one called as Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was established by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and the same year seven countries of South Asia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka established South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The third wave of

[11] Retrieved from https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/264, accessed on May 28, 2017.
[12] *Ibid*.,
[13] Asean expanded from six to ten members by including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.

regionalism witnessed a shift from inter-governmental to non-governmental organizations particularly in the areas of cooperation on environmental, energy, water, education, culture, science and technology with a purpose to enhance the level of connectivity among people. The third wave of regionalism is different from the first two waves because it focuses on connectivity through technology regardless of impediments namely mindset which is hostile to regional cooperation and the very concept of regionalism.

How regional cooperation and regionalism are viewed in the three Asias and what is the level of awareness in the three strategically important regions about regionalism? As discussed earlier, the process of regional cooperation and regionalism was unleashed in the three Asias in the second wave of regionalism. Inspired from the success of EEC in promoting economic, trade, communications and travel cooperation and the launching of a similar process in South East Asia, the countries of Central, West and South Asia found regionalism relevant and beneficial for the progress and development of their region.

Regional cooperation in the three Asias under the leadership of ECO and SAARC can lead to following positive results:

1. Strengthen the process of human and social development because trade, commercial and other activities launched by ECO and SAARC will create opportunities for employment and business activities.
2. Regional cooperation will help augment human security in the three Asias.
3. Extremism, violence and terrorism which are considered as a common threat in the three Asias will be properly dealt with.
4. Peace and stability, which is fragile in many countries of three Asias will be strengthened.

The Concept of Three Asias

Far reaching geo-political and geo-strategic changes taking place after the end of the Second World War; Cold war years and in the post-cold war era shaped the dynamics of the three Asias. The most significant change which came in the three Asias was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asian republics from the tutelage of Moscow. West Asia is composed of Iran and Turkey. South Asia is composed of Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Whereas, Central Asia is composed of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan is located both in Central and South Asia and hence is a member of ECO and SAARC.

Map of the Asia Composed of Central, South and West Asia

Source: http://www.diercke.com/kartenansicht.xtp?artId=978-3-14-100790-9&seite=98&id=17562&kartennr=1 accessed on, July 12, 2017.

The core of the three Asias is South Asia because it is the most populous region having maximum number of countries. Afghanistan is the only country in South Asia which has borders with three Central Asian countries: Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan whereas, Pakistan and Afghanistan have borders with Iran, a West Asian country. The concept of three Asias emerged after the independence of the Soviet Central Asian Republics and the expansion of ECO from three original members, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey by including six more members representing Central Asia.

Conceptually, "the shared concerns of Central, West and South Asia range from environmental, water, energy, refugees, and poverty concerns to political, security, ethnic, religious and territorial issues. The linkages in the three Asias promote both a sense of identity and diversity in the three regions."[14] Furthermore, "religion, nationalism, secularism and democracy are important trends influencing the three Asias and the future of these

[14] Moonis Ahmar, "The Emergence Of Three Asias" *World Affairs*, 2(1), (New Delhi: April-June 1998):122

regions depends on the cooperation and conflict arising from these trends."[15] There are four major factors which can help understand the concept of three Asias. First, the geographical contiguity of the three regions and their shared historical, religious and cultural backgrounds. For a long period of time, the three Asias were ruled by the Muslim empires and except Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey were colonized by the British and Russian Empires. The British and Russian imperialistic ambitions in Central Asia and in the Indian sub-continent coined the term the "Great Game"[16] of 19th century which transformed Afghanistan as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires.

Second, the ideological factor has remained significant in the three Asias following the Russian revolution and the surge of political Islam. With the demise of the Soviet bloc and the marginalization of communism as an ideology of power, the vacuum was largely filled by political Islam and those groups propagating the proclamation of Shariah as asserted by Al-Qaeda and Da'ish. It is not only the rise of political Islam followed by Islamic extremism that impacted on the majority of the countries of Central, West and South Asia, but the rise of Hindu and Buddhist nationalism in India and Sri Lanka also generated serious threats to these two South Asian countries. Nevertheless, religious extremism and terrorism are the challenges which are common in the three Asias and provide an opportunity for SAARC and ECO to adopt collective measures to deal with issues which cause intolerance, extremism, radicalization, violence and terrorism in the three regions. Third, dangerous threats emanating from environmental pollution; energy and water shortages in the three Asias provide adequate justification to SAARC and ECO to formulate common strategies which can help deal with such threats. At the moment, there is lack of coordination between SAARC and ECO to deal with issues like the melting of glaciers, global warming, deforestation and the erosion of water resources. The glaciers of Hindu Kush and Himalayas, which are a major source of water for Central And South Asia are facing a serious threat to their survival. SAARC since its inception in December 1985 has done a lot of studies on such issues but has not been able to go beyond paper work. It can share decades of its work with ECO so that the two regional organizations facing similar issues and problems can jointly formulate strategies in third regard.

Finally, the challenges of good governance, rule of law and proper justice system are prevailing in the three Asias. Exchange of ideas, skills and expertise between SAARC and ECO to deal with issues which cause bad governance, absence of the rule of law and inefficient justice system can surely help the countries of the three Asias eradicate extremism, intolerance, violence, radicalization and terrorism from their societies. From Turkey to

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[15] *Ibid*., p. 123.

[16] Peter Hopirk, *The Great Game The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha International, 1992).

Bangladesh and from Kazakhstan to Sri Lanka, the countries of the three Asias face the challenge of governance and violence and as a result of joint projects launched by ECO and SAARC one can expect peace, stability and progress achievable in coming decades. For that matter, ECO and SAARC can formulate joint study groups and networks to proceed for identifying common areas of cooperation in order to ensure better future for around 2 billion people of the three Asias.

Building Bridges in the Three Asias

How the gap in the three Asias, which exist in terms of regional cooperation can be bridged and what are the impediments in this regard? Unlike the North East Asian region, where there is no regional organization to represent that important landmass, Central, West and South Asia are represented by ECO and SAARC. Building bridges in the three Asias is not only the task at the governmental level but non-governmental organizations can contribute enormously to develop connectivity and linkages on various areas of cooperation.

There are three ways to build bridges in the three Asias. First, communication linkages in the form of roads and railways connecting Kazakhstan with India and Turkey with Bangladesh. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a multi-billion dollar project linking the Western parts of China to the Arabian Sea is an innovative idea but is only limited to China and Pakistan. Yet, under the Chinese vision of 'One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) communication linkages can be extended to other parts of three Asia by reviving the old silk route. When a network of modern roads, highways and railways can be established in the three Asias one can expect huge expansion in trade, commerce and business activities. Regional cooperation through communication linkages will also help expand tourism, educational, cultural and scientific ties. China, in view of its vision of 'One Belt and One Road" can be a useful partner and contributor for communication linkages in the three Asia because of its geographical proximity with the three regions. China has borders with five out of eight SAARC members and has also borders with the two Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Its inclusion for building bridges in the three Asias can be a 'game changer'. But, building bridges in the three Asias would also require political will and determination of the members of ECO and SAARC to pursue a practical approach and move in the direction of connecting the three regions. Second, ECO and SAARC can have a joint summit in order to identify areas of mutual cooperation and strategies to move forward in order to give a practical shape to regionalism in the three Asias. Afghanistan and Pakistan as the two members of ECO and SAARC can play their role for holding such a joint summit so as to deal with issues which are common in nature; require collective wisdom and efforts.

Paradoxically, both ECO and SAARC established in the same year are however unable to perform better. The challenge of building bridges in the three Asias provides an opportunity to these two regional organizations to connect and work together for a better future. At some stage, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[17] composed of Russia, China, Central Asian countries, India and Pakistan can also be involved to work with ECO and SAARC in order to establish security connectivity in the three Asia. Third, building of bridges in the three Asias would require promoting free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Easing of Visa restrictions along with free movement of goods, services and capital may look like a pipe dream but the vision of regionalism in the three Asias cannot be transformed into a reality unless the leadership of the three countries act above their parochial interests and adopt a forward looking approach.

At the moment, there is little evidence to prove about institutional linkages between ECO and SAARC which happen to be the two regional organizations representing the three Asias. Certainly, as compared to ECO, SAARC has done well in terms of holding summits, meetings of foreign ministers and foreign secretaries in the last three decades, but its performance in transforming the vision of regional cooperation in South Asia into a reality is dismal. There are several reasons as to why and how SAARC, unlike European Union (EU) and Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been unable to proceed for the free movement of people, goods, service and capital. The trade within the SAARC countries as compared to ASEAN and EU is marginal. SAARC has also become a hostage of Indo-Pak conflicts, a fact which exists because of the postponement[18] of 19th SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Islamabad last year when India, along with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh refused to attend that summit. Therefore, "over the years, SAARC has attempted to address several regional concerns, for instance drug and human trafficking, economic cooperation among South Asian states and the forging of its stated intentions, SAARC as a regional body has for years grappled with interstate, intrastate and regional conflicts. SAARC has been critical for its failure to forge an effective regional identity."[19] When SAARC itself is

[17] According to a Kazakh scholar "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in order to strengthen regional security and promote multidirectional as well as multilateral cooperation between member states. The organization has become a major regional structure possessing the ability to create mutually beneficial relations in trade and economic fields." For further information see, " Yergeniy Khon, "Prospects of Economic Cooperation in SCO Region," in *SCO's Role in Regional Stability Prospects of its Expansion* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2013), p.139.

[18] See news item> "SAARC summit in Pakistan postponed after member states pull out." *Daily Dawn* (Karachi, September 28, 2016)

[19] Zhahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar, "SAARC and Interstate conflicts In South Asia: Prospects and Challenges for Regionalism," *Pakistan Horizon*, 61(3), (Karachi, July 2008): 70

facing a major predicament to its survival as a viable regional organization, how it can forge linkages with ECO or other regional organizations is a question which needs to be analyzed by those who want to seek better connectivity and cooperation in the three Asias.

Prospects and Impediments

What are the prospects for unleashing the process of regional cooperation and regionalism in the three Asias and what are the impediments in this regard? How the countries of Central, West and South Asia can move forward and take practical steps for establishing connectivity in the three Asias? Three major prospects for establishing linkages among the three Asias can be visualized. First, realizing that there is no alternate to peace, cooperation and human development, the three Asias with substantial political will and determination can take institutional measures for establishing economic, trade, commercial, cultural, security and environmental linkages. The road to human development, progress and prosperity passes through meaningful regional cooperation as it happened in case of European Union and ASEAN. In the absence of inter and intra-regional trade, travel, tourism, educational, scientific and environmental linkages, one cannot expect the goal of human development to reach a practical stage. Second, if CPEC succeeds in transforming the concept of 'one belt and one road' into a reality, one can expect wider prospects for regional cooperation in the three Asias because the communication linkages between the Western region of China and the Arabian Sea can be of use to Iran, India and Central Asian states. Already, Pakistan and China have offered Central, West and South Asian countries to join CPEC and benefit connectivity from roads, highways and railways for trade and commercial purposes. China has multiple stakes and interests in Central, West and South Asia and its involvement for providing connectivity through trade, commerce and modernizing the communication linkages can go a long way in linking different parts of three Asias. Furthermore, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline project will connect Central and South Asia. Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline which was earlier Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project will connect West and South Asia.

Third, since almost all the countries of the three Asias are facing the threats of extremism, intolerance, militancy, violence, radicalization and terrorism, henceforth it is their legitimate concern and need to collectively deal with such threats in a collective and prudent manner. Likewise, prospects of regional cooperation in the three Asias can also become bright because of human security challenges particularly global warming and climate change. If Aral Sea, which till 1960 was the world's fourth fresh water lake, is termed as a single manmade disaster because of its erosion, one can figure out similar situation in South Asia because of the scarcity of

water resources and melting of glaciers. What is required is to give practical shape to such prospects which can ensure human development. Again, there are prospects for building institutional linkages to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues by SAARC and ECO so that the people of the three Asias can aspire for a better future.

As far as the impediments for transforming the vision of regional cooperation in Central, West and South Asia into a reality are concerned, there is no short cut to deal with issues which are a cause of insecurity, instability, under-development and violence in the three Asia. Six major impediments which can be identified in the three Asias as far as regional cooperation is concerned are as follows:-

1. Intra-regional conflicts particularly India and Pakistan, which impedes the process of regional cooperation under the auspices of SAARC.
2. Violence and instability in Afghanistan which precludes connectivity between Central and South Asia. As a strategically located country having its borders with Central and South Asian countries, absence of peace in Afghanistan makes it difficult to forge connectivity between the two regions.
3. Lack of proper awareness and commitment in the three Asias as far as the concept of regional cooperation and regionalism is concerned. The existence of SAARC and ECO representing the three Asias however is unable to formulate a proactive approach by these two organizations to launch joint programs in order to connect Central, West and South Asia.
4. Except Turkey, which has a modern infrastructure and is the 19th largest world economy, no other country in Central, West and South Asia has been able to proceed for the achievement of millennium development goals. Although, Indian economy has considerably improved in the last two decades, it is still behind to eradicate poverty, illiteracy and improve quality of life of its people. Without better education and a professional approach to move in the direction of modernization and market economy, the goal of regional cooperation and regionalism cannot be achieved.
5. Extremism, intolerance, militancy, radicalization and terrorism are the major impediments in shaping the vision of regional cooperation and regionalism a reality in the three Asias. The surge of religious extremism, particularly among the youths of the three Asias is a major threat to future progress and development to the three regions. Whether it is the Kurdish problem or the rise of ISIS in Turkey, or Iran's security issues with the Arab Gulf countries, the two West Asian countries are facing a major predicament in dealing with matters which threaten their own security. Likewise, the countries of Central and South Asia are also vulnerable to violence and terrorism which SCO and SAARC are trying to deal with.
6. Lack of professional approach in giving practical shape to ideas, concepts, proposals and plans which are worked out and presented after several brainstorming sessions of ECO and SAARC for regional

connectivity. Since 1981, when meetings of foreign secretaries of South Asian countries were held to identify areas of regional cooperation till today, a lot of work has been done in this regard but to utter dismay beyond meetings nothing concrete has been reached which reflects lack of professional approach by the concerned stakeholders. To a large extent same is the case with ECO where since 1992, when that regional organization was expanded in its present form, not much has been achieved in promoting connectivity and regional cooperation among the member states.

How such impediments could be removed requires the pursuance of practical approach in order to transform the vision of regional cooperation and regionalism in the three Asias into a reality. The idea to hold a joint summit of ECO and SAARC needs to be given a serious thought so that the stakeholders of the two regional organizations can enter into serious and meaningful brainstorming sessions so as to formulate strategies which can connect the three Asias through an institutional process.

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